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To the kind and dignified people who have seen their homes demolished, to whom the law was 
neither friend nor saviour – I hope you are never subjected to such again. 
 
A luta continua. 
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UNLAWFULLY OCCUPYING THE 
BRIDGE TO TRANSFORMATION: 
A CASE FOR JUDICIAL EXPROPRIATION 
WHEN EVICTIONS ARE 
UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE 
 
“We are trapped in a vicious cycle of economic, intellectual, social, and political death. 
Inferior jobs, inferior housing, inferior education which in turn again leads to inferior jobs.” 





Housing is not simply brick and mortar. When an unlawful occupier states that they will simply 
move to occupy other land if they are evicted, it is clear that they do so out of need.1 Access to 
shelter is linked to numerous human needs and rights, and often predetermines one’s ability to 
climb up the social ladder. Housing is related to job opportunities, hence the rapid increase in 
the rate of urbanisation in South Africa. Housing is also related to one’s right to human dignity. 
Consequently, the Constitutional Court has spoken of the need to treat unlawful occupiers with 
grace and dignity.2 The slow pace of the State’s provision of housing, coupled with the private 
housing market’s inability to cater for poor and vulnerable sections of society, has meant that 
informal settlements have become a common feature in South Africa. With the increasing 
polarisation in class and wealth, informal settlements have become the most viable way for 
poor people to get shelter. 
 
A study of the different urban housing policies shows that large numbers of people are falling 
through the cracks and are not being catered for. As long as people have no resort but to occupy 
 
1 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Any room for the Poor? Forced Evictions in Johannesburg, South 
Africa, (8 March 2005) Centre on Housing and Evictions available at 
https://issuu.com/cohre/docs/cohre_anyroomforthepoor_forcedevict, accessed on 22 November 2020. When 
a resident of Joel Street, Berea was interviewed by the Centre of Housing Rights and Evictions, they simply 
said: 
‘If they evict us, we’ll sleep on the streets for a while, until we find somewhere else to go. I can’t 
leave the city. If I do, my family will starve.’ 
2 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (PE Municipality) para 37. 
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land to get shelter, informal settlements are here to stay. However, unlawful occupation 
happens on an indiscriminate basis, meaning that often, privately owned land falls prey to 
unlawful occupied. In cases of unlawful occupation of private land, there are two core rights 
which are at play: the right of unlawful occupiers not to be arbitrarily evicted,3 and the right of 
property owners not to be deprived of their property, except through the operation of a law of 
general application.4 These rights often operate at odds with each other. Although eviction 
cases have been thoroughly adjudicated by South African courts, this balancing act between 
the two rights has not always been at play.5 While all cases of unlawful occupation of private 
 
 
3 Section 26 of the Constitution: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.” 
4 Section 25 of the Constitution: 
“(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application – 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of 
which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, 
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having 
regard to all relevant circumstances, including – 
(a) the current use of the property; 
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(c) the market value of the property; 
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property; and 
(e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
(4) For the purposes of this section – 
(a) the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to 
bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources; and 
(b) property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to 
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to 
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to 
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, 
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of 
section 36(1). 
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).” 
5 This ascertainment is made by reading the housing cases which have come to the forefront in the Constitutional 
Court. See namely President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 
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land involve a limitation of the owner’s right to property, this limitation was rarely dealt with 
as it was seldom the case that this limitation would be permanent. Thus, when the final 
Constitution was promulgated,6 eviction cases were often dealt with through a narrow prism: 
only under section 26 of the Constitution. 
 
However, when the Modderklip CC case was brought to court, South African courts had no 
choice but to carefully weigh and consider the interaction between sections 25 and 26 of the 
Constitution.7 While the Supreme Court of Appeal discussed the interactions of these two rights 
at length,8 the Constitutional Court declined to consider expropriation of the occupied land as 
a plausible remedy for the ongoing unlawful occupation. A few years later, the High Court of 
South Africa, Western Cape Division (High Court) in Fischer,9 a case with similar facts as 
Modderklip CC, ordered the State to negotiate a buy-out with the owner of the occupied 
property. The High Court in that matter opted to go through this route as it would allow it to 
review the State’s decision should it decide to not expropriate the occupied properties. 
 
This approach has led numerous scholars and even some courts,10 to believe that judicial 
expropriation was not allowed under the Constitution. Thus, there seems to be a lack of analysis 
of these rights and their interaction in the judicial landscape. However, a court tasked with 
interpreting a transformative constitution ought to do so in an effort to “recognise the injustices 
of our past”11 and address them. The bridge to a constitutional democracy, to transformation, 
cannot be traversed if it is unlawfully occupied. One cannot simply turn a blind eye to this 
 
 
(5) SA 3 (CC) (Modderklip CC) and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 
39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC). 
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7 Modderklip CC supra note 5; This case was not the first one to deal with sections 25 and 26 but it was the first 
one where the courts had to consider the impact of the defence created under section 26(3) against the private 
land owner’s right to not be deprived of property save through the operation of a law of general application. 
8 Modder East Squatters and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 (3) All SA 169 (SCA) (Modderklip (SCA). 
9 Fischer v Persons Listed on Annexure X to the Notice of Motion and those Persons whose Identity are Unknown 
to the Applicant and who are Unlawfully Occupying or Attempting to Occupy Erf 150 (Remaining Extent) Phillipi, 
Cape Division, Province of the Western Cape; Stock v Persons Unlawfully Occupying Erven 145, 152, 156, 418, 
3107, Phillipi & Portion 0 Farm 597, Cape Rd; Copper Moon Trading 203 (Pty) Ltd v Persons whose Identities are 
to the Applicant Unknown and who are Unlawfully Occupying Remainder Erf 149, Phillipi, Cape Town 2018 2 SA 
228 (WCC). 
10 As will be seen later AJ van der Walt was one of the scholars who was skeptical about the courts’ power to 
order land expropriation. As for the courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality v Dada NO and Others (4) SA 463 (SCA) at para 13 was unequivocal about the fact that judicial 
deference should be preferred instead of overzealous judicial activism to “get things moving”. 
11 Preamble of the Constitution. 
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phenomenon as if it were only a minute obstacle on the road. The import of the current housing 
crisis and the ever-increasing risk of grand-scale unlawful land occupation should be 
understood in a larger context. Informal settlements did not spring like mushrooms, overnight  
and out of thin air, in 1994. Unlawful occupation, informal settlements and rapid urbanization 
are direct consequences of apartheid laws and policies. 
 
(a) History of land tenure security and Black land ownership in South Africa 
 
 
It is astounding that courts have avoided this exercise up to 26 years after democracy, 
considering that this crisis arose due to colonisation and apartheid and persists to this day. It is 
no novel conclusion that the subjugation of Black South Africans (Africans) was achieved 
through a long-lasting, multi-layered oppressive regime, which always had its focus on the 
dispossession of the land of Africans.12 During the 18th century, settlers were still at war with 
Africans and it took nine bloody wars ‘before the position of European paramountcy was 
achieved’.13 Settlers sought to limit and control how Africans were able to access and hold 
rights to land, and thus, a system of individual tenure modelled on European and Western 
conceptions of individual ownership was introduced. The State prevented Africans from 
participating in this tenure system regulated through title deeds and the Deeds Registry. 
Instead, a secondary inferior system of tenure was introduced for Africans – the nature and 
content of the rights held by Africans were completely controlled by officials of the colonial 
State. 
 
Settlers were convinced that ‘the system of individual tenure was the ultimate solution to the 
native question’.14 This approach was especially endorsed because communal tenure, as was 
held by Africans, was flexible and responsive, allowing African groups to move freely, not 
containing them to specific areas which individual tenure would have achieved. This, coupled 
with the serious shortage of labour in 1890s, gave rise more laws to contain African groups 
and frustrate communal land ownership. Thus, in 1894, the Glen Grey Act was enacted.15 The 
Glen Grey Act was the first to establish a particular pattern of landholding in South which 
 
12 R T Ally The development of the system of individual tenure for Africans with special reference to the Glen Grey 
Act, c 1894 – 1922 (M.A. Thesis, Rhodes University, 1985) 78. 
13 S Lekhela A Historical Survey of Native Land Settlement in South Africa from 1902 to the Passing of the 
Natives’ Trust and Land Act of 1936 (MA Thesis, University of South Africa, 1955) 19. 
14 Ibid at p 100. 
15 Act 25 of 1894. 
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aimed at replacing communal tenure with individual tenure and was consequently seen as ‘a 
key moment in the disenfranchising of Africans and restricting civil and land rights’.16 Per 
Cecil Rhodes’ speech, it is clear that the Glen Grey Act was enacted to control the increase in 
the African population and the colony’s labour shortage.17 Yet, as the Glen Grey Act was not 
as successful at containing Africans to a specific area, the Native Lands Act was promulgated 
a few years later to make uniform, across South Africa, the segregation of races through the 
restriction and regulation of land acquisition. ‘The Native Lands Act was actually ratifying and 
setting in law a dispossession that started much earlier, centuries earlier.’18 
 
Section 1(2) of the Native Lands Act made the aim behind its promulgation clear, ‘scheduled 
native areas’ were cordoned for the exclusive use and purchase of Africans.19 Section 1(4) of 
the Native Lands Act also stated that any agreement concluded outside the scope of section 
1(2) was null and void ab initio. The contravention of said sections was punishable by law. It 
was the first Act under the Union Government of South Africa to bind the movement of 
Africans only to specifically scheduled reserve areas.20 It also limited the ability of Africans to 
hold any rights – as determined by colonial officials – to these same areas. Only seven per cent 
of South African land was put aside for Africans.21 The land allocated to Africans in terms of 
the Native Land Act was not held by Black people in their own right but by various State- 
controlled entities. 
 
The Native Trust and Land Act created the South African Development Trust (the Trust), a 
consolidated entity to hold the land that hand been set aside for Africans, and increased the 





16 R Hall The Politics of Land Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 1990 to 2004: A Shifting Terrain of Power, 
Actors and Discourses (PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010) 75. 
17 C J Rhodes ‘Glen Grey Act (The Native Issue)’ South African History Online, available at 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/glen-grey-act-native-issue-cecil-john-rhodes-july-30-1894-cape-house- 
parliament, accessed on 17 November 2020. 
18 C Osorio ‘100 years since the Native Land Act: an interview with Ben Cousins’ GroundUp 26 June 2013, 
available at https://www.groundup.org.za/article/100-years-nativeland-act-interview-ben-cousins1048/, 
accessed on 17 November 2020. 
19 Black Land Act 27 of 1914 at section 1(2). 
20 Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives ‘Land issues: Blackspots, Forced Removals and Resettlement’ 
available at http://paton.ukzn.ac.za/Collections/blackspotsandforcedremovals.aspx, accessed on 17 November 
2020. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Act 18 of 1936. 
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buying land in each of the provinces for African settlements.23 Tenure could by only be held 
by Africans through the Trust and the Trust determined the nature of the rights held and access 
to the land. Africans did not have rights of ownership like the white population; tenure was 
conditional and depended on whether one was a man, along with other conditions.24 
Additionally, tenure did not include the right to alienate the property. The Trust’s land would 
be administered for ‘settlement, support, benefit, and material welfare of the natives of the 
Union’.25 This land, reserved exclusively for Black people, came with extremely restricted 
forms of rights. Rights came in the form of either ‘Permissions to Occupy’ (PTOs) or 99-year 
leaseholds – which were capable of being cancelled administratively.26 Under the 1913 and 
1936 Land Acts, approximately 614 000 people were removed from ‘black spots’.27 If one were 
to count informal settlement removals, infrastructural removals and political removals, around 
185 500 more people were removed.28 
 
Statistics by the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) show that between the period of 
1948-1984, 300 000 people of colour were evicted from farms. Another 115 000 people were 
moved from black spots and reserves respectively.29 The motivation behind these mass 
evictions was to ‘prevent the possibility of guerrillas moving easily amongst the farm 
population’.30 The evictions were done from non-scheduled, non-released land and freehold 
areas – the former consisting of dispersed land owned by a particular racial group. These forced 
removals were rooted in section 26 of the Native Trust and Land Act. The Native 
Administration Act31 was enacted and further limited land ownership by giving the white 
regime the executive power to remove Africans from land declared as white areas, and relocate 
them. This further accelerated the limitation of African land ownership and overcrowding, as 
well as environmental degradation on land Africans were permitted to occupy.32 
 
23 C Fourie ‘Land and the cadastre in South Africa: Its history and present government policy’ (2000), paper 
presented as a Guest Lecture at the International Institute of Aerospace Survey and Earth Sciences (ITC), 
Enschede, The Netherlands. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Section 4(1) of the Natives Trust and Land Act. 
26 Supra note 12. 
27 A ‘black spot’ was an area of land where Black people lived despite the area being situated in an area that had 
been allocated for the white population. J Van Wyk, M Oranje ‘The post-1994 South African spatial planning 
system and Bill of Rights: A meaningful and mutually beneficial fit?’ (2014) 13(4) Planning Theory 349. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Supra note 13 at 5; The official published figures of forced removals are not representative of those being 
forcibly removed as they only indicate the people who brought their cases to court. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Act 38 of 1927. 





As the land which was allocated to Africans was not in urban areas, Africans were ‘temporary 
residents’ in cities and towns. The 1937 Slums Act actively prevented Africans from acquiring 
land in urban areas.33 The Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, which was put into place 
in 1945, outlined four different categories of urban residents and tenure rights which Africans 
were entitled to in urban areas.34 They all linked an African’s right to be in the city to their 
employment. The Group Areas Act followed the Black (Urban Areas) Act and made a 
distinction between areas subjected to different extent of control through use, occupation and 
ownership based on race.35 This Act distinguished between Africans, Coloureds, Asians and 
white people. Consequently, individuals from certain race groups were prohibited from using, 
occupying and owning land in areas selected for other race groups. The relevant sections of 
both Acts were copied verbatim in the proclamation of the Regulations Governing the Control 
and Supervision of an Urban Bantu Residential Area and Relevant Matters.36 
 
The Group Areas Act was promulgated after the National Party came into power in 1948 and 
was tasked almost exclusively with ‘cleaning’ black spots. Those areas were usually fertile 
land prime for cultivation, as opposed to land set aside for Africans, which was generally 
overcrowded and overgrazed.37 The Group Areas Act was the main tool under which forced 
removal and dispossession of Indian and Coloured communities took place. Dr. Malan, the 
Prime Minister of South Africa when apartheid was implemented, called the Group Areas Act  
the ‘heart of apartheid’.38 Under the infamous Group Areas Act, and between 1960 and 1983, 
approximately 7.5 million people were forcibly removed.39 
 
The Group Areas Act was responsible for the creation of areas such as Lenasia, Eldorado Park, 
Chatsworth and Mitchell’s Plain; and destroyed areas such as Cator Manor (Durban), South 
End (Port Elizabeth), District Six (Cape Town), Fordsburg, Vrededorp, Pageview and 
Sophiatown (Johannesburg).40 The former areas are now townships while the destroyed areas 
are well known for having been subject to violent mass evictions during apartheid. Many of 
 
33 Supra note 16 at 78. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Act 36 of 1966 and Act 21 of 1923. 
36 Proc R1036 in GG Extraordinary 2096 of 14 June 1968. 
37 S Rugege ‘Land reform in South Africa: An overview’ (2004) 32 Int’l J. Legal Info 285. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid at 286. 
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the victims have up to this day not been accommodated back on what used to be their land. 
Although many other laws and policies came after the Group Areas Act, it is this Act that did 
the most damage and set out the main laws under which forced removals were imposed on non- 
white communities, and ownership rights of Africans were undermined. All these legislations 
were so effective at stripping Africans of their land rights that, four years before democracy, 
in 1990, only one per cent of homeland residents had freehold access to land.41 
 
(b) Problem Statement 
This in-depth description of certain legislations’ impact on Black people’s rights and relations 
to their land shows that during apartheid, there was a deliberate move to dispossess people of 
colour of land. The effects of such a deliberate, prolonged and painful process can only be 
addressed and undone through a more robust, and equally as deliberate move underpinned by 
a constitutional and legislative framework. Consequently, these wrongs have given rise to 
rights which are now engraved in the Bill of Rights and which have in turn caused several Acts, 
to be implemented. Two of these rights, on which this dissertation pivots, are the rights to not 
be deprived of property under section 25 of the Constitution and the right to access to housing 
under section 26 thereof. Out of the socio-economic rights cases that have been heard in the 
Constitutional Court, the preponderance of those concerning the right to access to housing is 
flagrant.42 This is hardly surprising as the number of housing cases coming to South African 
courts is reflective of the disparity between the original aims of the State for the provision of 
housing, and the State’s disappointing delivery.43 While this criticism is not devoid of 
appreciation of the constraints which the State faces, it is nonetheless an acknowledgment that 
the State ought to look into changing its approach to housing delivery. Yet, until the State 
causes this shift to happen, the existing problems will remain. With the slow access to housing 
currently at play, it is not controversial to reach the conclusion that these problems have 
reached unprecedented proportions. Thus, not unlike in the litigation of many other rights, the 
judiciary and civil society find themselves doing more of the heavy lifting. Unfortunately, 
while the expansive jurisprudence which the Constitutional Court has developed and the 





41 G Muller ‘The Legal-Historical Context of Urban Forced Evictions in South Africa’ (2013) Unisa Press 368. 
42 K Tissington, Evictions and Alternative Accommodation in South Africa 2000-2016: An analysis of the 




Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE),44 provide a detailed and progressive legal framework 
tackling evictions, there are still aspects of evictions which remain unexplored. 
 
These unexplored aspects not only highlight the need for a new approach in the provision of 
housing but also beg the question of whether more can be done under the existing conditions. 
One of these aspects concerns whether South African courts can order the State to expropriate 
land in cases where the eviction of the unlawful occupiers would be unjust and inequitable. 
Although scholars have written on this matter, courts have steered clear from this remedy and, 
more distressingly, the Constitutional Court has opted to not discuss the matter when it had the 
opportunity to do so. 
 
This paper is based on the hypothesis that the executive is empowered to expropriate land for 
the provision of housing and that South African courts have the power to compel the State to 
expropriate land in situations that would otherwise give rise to a permanent limitation of rights, 
the right to property and to access to housing respectively. Based on this theory, this paper 
considers whether South African courts can order land expropriation in cases of occupation of 
land by a large number of occupiers when the State has not done so.45 
 
(c) Research Questions 
This paper requires the in-depth consideration of the following questions: 
a. What is the relationship between the right to property of the owner of the unlawfully 
occupied land and the right to access to housing of the unlawful occupiers? 
b. What has the courts’ approach been in relation to the expropriation of land for the 
provision of housing? 
c. Can courts order the State to expropriate land? 
 
 
(d) Literature Review 
 
 
Although this issue is one which has been avoided by the courts, some academics have 
considered it through various lenses. In fact, the relationship between sections 25 and 26 has 
been so thoroughly researched that, after the advent of the Constitution, a new branch of law 
 
 
44 Act 19 of 1998. 
45 The number of occupiers is one of the factors which will be considered in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
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was developed: constitutional property law.46 The leading thinker of constitutional property 
law is late AJ van der Walt, whose work will be extensively referred to in this dissertation. Van 
der Walt has written a book about constitutional property law, of which various editions have 
been published. He also wrote about housing rights in numerous articles; discussing 
expropriation and housing rights at length.47 This dissertation would be amiss in its reflections 
on the relationship between sections 25 and 26, if it were to not engage with van der Walt’s 
writing. 
 
More specifically, Dugard looks into the question of whether courts can compel the State to 
expropriate property in cases where evictions would be unjust and inequitable by revisiting 
Modderklip.48 In her article, she focuses on van der Walt’s approach to expropriation which in 
turn primarily considers administrative expropriation and remains cautious of judicial 
expropriation.49 Dugard reflects that the Court in Fischer provides a novel remedy, thereby 
creating a ‘new, grey area between administrative and judicial expropriation’50 by ordering the 
State to consult with the private landowners concerned and negotiate in an effort to purchase 
the properties, and if that should not possible, the State ought to report back to the Court on the 
negotiations. While Dugard does not provide a definitive answer to whether courts can compel 
the State to expropriate land for housing under certain conditions, she critiques the literature 
and avoidant approach that South African courts have so far adopted. 
 
The other writings surrounding Modderklip has come in the form of scholars discussing about 
the conditions of the Gabon township which is where the Modderklip farm is located.51 This 
writing has mostly focused on the current state of Gabon despite the Constitutional Court’s 
remedy of constitutional damages which were to be paid by the State to the land owner until 





46 AJ Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) Juta and Company Ltd. 
47 AJ Van der Walt "The State’s duty to protect owners v the State's duty to provide housing: Thoughts on the 
Modderklip Case" (2005) South African Journal on Human Rights, vol. 21, no. 1, 144-62. 
48 J Dugard "Modderklip revisited: Can courts compel the State to expropriate property where the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers is not just and equitable?" (2018) PER / PELJ 21. 
49 Ibid at 16. 
50 Ibid at 17. 
51 See further K Tissington ‘Demolishing Development at Gabon Informal Settlement: Public Interest Litigation 
beyond Modderklip’ (2011) South African Journal on Human Rights, vol. 27, no. 1 192. 
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This chapter has delineated the parameters of this dissertation, by discussing the history of land 
dispossession in South Africa, and the need for this topic to be researched. It also aims to offer 
a road map of how this will be achieved. The next chapter will consider sections 25 and 26 of 
the Constitution respectively by looking into how these constitutional provisions came into 
being and how they have so far been interpreted by the Constitutional Court. After these 
individual analyses, the relationship between the two rights will be discussed at length. 
 
The third chapter will look into how courts have approached land expropriation for the 
provision of housing. Building on the interpretation of sections 25 and 26 put forward in the 
second chapter, this chapter will deal with the Constitutional Court’s finding in Modderklip 
CC, PE Municipality as well as the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Modderklip SCA.52 
Finally, this chapter will contrast these approaches to the High Court’s approach in Fischer. 
 
The fourth chapter will consider whether South African courts are empowered to order the 
State to expropriate land under section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. This chapter will critically 
engage other scholars’ and courts’ arguments against judicial expropriation. The fourth chapter 
will make a strong case that the courts are empowered to do so and, in some cases, even 
mandated to do so. This will be done firstly by considering the tenets of judicial land 
expropriation, and secondly by contemplating the arguments as to why courts ought not to be 
able to order the State to expropriate land when consequential evictions would be unjust and 
inequitable. 
 
Finally, in the fifth and concluding chapter, the findings of this paper will be discussed and 
accompanied by recommendations as to when the courts ought to order the State to expropriate 
land as a primary remedy. 
 
(f) Limitations and Methodology 
While there are numerous instances where townships have expanded over privately-owned 
land, thus creating occurrences of unlawful land occupation, these occupations do not often 
become the subject of litigation. Even if they do, the subject matter does not always concern 
the balancing exercise of sections 25 and 26 because there are very few of these cases where 
parties brought up the remedy of expropriation and an even fewer number where this remedy 
 
52 Supra note 8. 
16 
 
was a viable alternative. Hence, this paper has narrowed its focus to two particular cases, 
Modderklip and Fischer. These were cases where the immediate eviction of the unlawful 
occupiers would have been prima facie unjust and inequitable, and thus, unlawful. While the 
number of occupiers which had been served with eviction notices in both cases had been more 
than a hundred, the number of unlawful occupiers was in the thousands. This made the 
possibility of a just and equitable eviction almost nil, due to various factors, including the lack 
of suitable alternative land, and the inability to have meaningful engagement. Thus, the 
arguments made in this dissertation will only apply to circumstances similar to those in 
Modderklip and Fischer. 
17 
 
II. THE CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTIONS 25 AND 26 OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 
 
As a starting point, this dissertation concedes that expropriation is a drastic remedy. However, 
an argument is made that certain circumstances call for such a drastic remedy. This argument 
in part involves the fact that, by suspending an eviction order in cases where the eviction is 
clearly unjust and equitable, the right of the property owner is being limited. Depending on 
how long this limitation endures, an argument could be made that the limitation becomes 
unjustifiable. The property owner’s right in property is protected under section 25 of the 
Constitution, more specifically section 25(1), while the unlawful occupier’s right to not be 
arbitrarily evicted of their home is found under section 26 of the Constitution, in particular 
section 26(3). On a superficial reading of the two sections, one could believe that the two are 
at odds with each other. To remedy this potential erroneous understanding, this Chapter will 
consider the rights to property and access to housing under the Constitution in an effort to make 
the argument that there is no tension between the two, only a peculiar relationship. 
 
(a) International Law on the Rights to Adequate Housing and Land 
 
 
According to section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, a court should take into consideration 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. In terms of international law, two rights 
are of importance to this paper, article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).53 Both rights pertain to one’s entitlement to a ‘standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being’ of oneself and that includes adequate housing. Elaborating on 
these rights are General Comments 3, 4 and 7 on Covenant obligations.54 
 
General Comment 7 focuses on forced evictions. While it recognises that forced evictions may 
be justifiable in certain circumstances, it also discusses the requirement of adequate 





53 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 and UN General Assembly, International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993. 
54 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3 on the Nature of State Parties 
Obligations: Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 1990. 
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developments, large numbers of people may only be evicted as a last resort.55 The requirements 
of evictions are further set out in paragraph 15 of the Comment and encompasses the need for 
genuine consultation between the affected parties, reasonable notice of eviction, information 
on said eviction, the presence of government officials or representatives during the eviction, 
identification of people carrying out the eviction, to not evict people during bad weather or at 
night, and lastly, legal aid for people in need of it to seek redress.56 South Africa has adopted 
a progressive approach to the right to access to adequate housing, it encourages almost all the 
qualifications of the international laws as laid down by the UDHR and the ICESCR. 
 
Despite the recognition of the right to own property under Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights,57 it is widely recognized that the right to property arises only 
under the domestic law of respective nations. While many international human rights 
conventions discuss a right to property, main international human rights treaties do not adopt 
a discussion of the right.58 However, there have been scholarly debates as to whether the right 
to land has received international customary law status, due to it being recognized under 
numerous States’ domestic laws. For the purposes of this dissertation, the nonexistence of a 
stand-alone right to land in international law59 means that the interpretation of section 25 of the 
Constitution has not been informed by international law and as will be seen later, the reference 
grew obsolete in this context. 
 
(b) The interpretation and application of section 25 
While section 25 has been thoroughly debated in numerous texts, this paper is limited to a 
broad overview and preliminary analysis of the section. Also known as the property clause, 
section 25 is the lengthiest and arguably most complex right in the Bill of Rights.60 It is 
considered to be one of the most intricate property clauses around the world as it consists of 




55 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7 on Right to Adequate Housing: 
Forced Evictions, 1997. 
56 Ibid para 15. 
57 Universal Declaration of Human Rights supra note 51. 
58 J Gilbert ‘Land Rights as Human Rights’ (2013) SUR 18, available at https://sur.conectas.org/en/land-rights- 
human-rights/, accessed 1 November 2020. 
59 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Land and Human Rights: Standards and Applications’ 
available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Land_HR-StandardsApplications.pdf, accessed on 
17 November 2020. 
60 Supra note 46 at 2. 
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it considerably unique.61 Section 25(1) to (3) can be seen as the more conventional provisions, 
providing for the protection of existing property interests against State interference. Sections 
25(4) to (9) are a cluster of provisions that empower the State to promote land and other related 
reforms through various mechanisms. 
 
The first judicial interpretation of the property clause was done by the Constitutional Court, in 
the First Certification Case.62 It had to deal with two major objections. The first was that the 
section did not ‘expressly protect the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property as did 
section 28(1) of the Interim Constitution’63 and secondly, that the provisions guiding 
expropriation and relevant payable compensation were not adequate. The Constitutional Court 
dealt with these objections concisely, by comparing the formulated version of section 25 to the 
test of “universally accepted fundamental rights” under Constitutional Principle II of the  
Interim Constitution.64 This involved a brief survey of international and foreign law, to have a 
better grasp of the formulation of property clauses around the world. The Court found that 
despite the fact that article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 
‘everyone has the right to own property’ and that ‘no-one shall be arbitrarily deprived’ of 
property, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,65 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights66 did not contain any property protection. 
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is only binding to the extent that it has been 
granted customary international law status, the Court would only be guided by guarantees 
afforded by the covenants. 
 
As for comparative law, the Court held that not all recognized democracies contained property 
clauses in their bill of rights or constitutions and the democracies which did, did not always 
formulate the property protection in a uniform manner.67 While some countries expressed the 




62 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (First Certification 
Case). 
63 Ibid at para 70; Section 28 of the Interim Constitution read as follows: 
“(1) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights in property and, to the extent that the 
nature of the rights permits, to dispose of such rights.” 
64 Ibid. 
65 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights supra note 53. 
66 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 999 
67 Supra note 62 para 72. 
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in a positive way, establishing a right to acquire and dispose of property.68 Due to the absence 
of a uniform formulation of a property clause, the property clause met the test under 
Constitutional Principle II. The way in which the Court tackled the second objection was 
somewhat similar. It looked at the criteria for determining the amount for compensation in 
other countries and concluded that there was a broad range of factors for expropriation and the 
payment of compensation thereof. Due to the lack of consistency as to the criteria listed for 
expropriation and the payment of compensation, and the fact that the formulation adopted in 
section 25 was similar to certain other constitutions, the Court found that the section ‘cannot 
be said to flout any universally accepted approach’.69 Thus, the current wording of section 25 
was so adopted. 
 
Other than the original interpretation of the Constitutional Court, it is important, for purposes 
of interpretation, to analyze the structure of the property clause and its coherence. Earlier, the 
property clause was divided into two main clusters: one dealing with the protection of existing 
property interests (section 25(1) – (3)) and the other dealing with the State’s duty to promote 
land reform (section 25(4) – (9)). These clusters can be further divided into four. The sub- 
sections can be divided as follows: section 25(1) covers deprivation, while section 25(2) and 
(3) regulate expropriation. Section 25(4) deals with the interpretation of the whole clause and 
section 25(5) to (9) guide land and other related reforms. This structure regulates the way in 
which the property clause ought to be interpreted and applied respectively. Van der Walt 
believed that this structure is also essential in explaining the ‘tension between the provisions 
in section 25’ and the tension between section 25 and other constitutional rights (such as the 
right of access to adequate housing under section 26).70 In PE Municipality71 which will be 
discussed in depth in the next chapter, Sachs J. mentions the two-pronged structure of the 
provision, its wider historical and constitutional circumstance and the ‘broad constitutional 
matrix’ which englobes the legislation giving effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution.72 Van 
der Walt argued that this description by Sachs J. is the way in which section 25 should be 





69 Supra note 62 para 73. 
70 Supra note 46 at 16. 
71 Supra note 2. 
72 In this context, as will be seen later, the legislation in question was PIE supra note 2. 
73 Supra note 69. 
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This paper’s analysis of the property clause starts with section 25(1). The provision is 
negatively phrased and does not contain a positive guarantee of property, as did section 28(1) 
of the Interim Constitution. Although quite similar to section 28(2) of the Interim Constitution, 
section 25(1) dictates that deprivation of property should be done “in terms of a law of general 
application” while the former indicated that the deprivation ought to be ‘in accordance with a 
law’. These two parts of section 25(1) aim to achieve two goals. Section 25(1) establishes that 
the right to property is not absolute. This changed the common law radically, as prior to the 
Constitution, ownership was considered sacrosanct and, in many ways, inviolate.74 Hence, it is 
evident that the Constitution allows for State interferences, pertaining to regulatory 
deprivations, provided that they conform to the requirements in section 25(1). However, 
although there may be limitations to the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property, they may 
only be so if they are legitimate and indispensable regulatory limitations which may not be 
imposed in an arbitrary or unfair manner.75 
 
Section 25(2) sets out the requirements for expropriation to be legitimate. The requirements 
are as follows: the expropriation can only be imposed by a law of general application; it has to 
serve a public purpose or be in the public interest;76 and that compensation has to accompany 
expropriation and has to be just and equitable, as per section 25(3). Section 25(3) specifies that 
compensation ought to be determined per certain factors which are not a closed list, so as to 
demonstrate balance between the interests of those who were affected by the expropriation, 
and the public interest. As for section 25(4), it informs the interpretation of section 25 only.  
Section 25(4) specifies that property is not limited to land,77 and that ‘the public interest 
includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable  
access to all South Africa’s natural resources’. The last proviso seems to ensure that land may 
be expropriated even in circumstances where the ultimate beneficiary of the land is a private 
person.78 This provision is believed to have been included as a result of the fear that certain 
parties held, during the Interim Constitution negotiations, about the possible misinterpretation 
 
 
74 Supra note 46 at 17. 
75 Ibid. 
76 When the Interim Constitution’s property clause was being discussed, there was disagreement as to which 
term out of “public purpose” and “public interest” was the broader one so to avoid any mishaps, they were both 
included. 
77 The Constitutional Assembly believed that there was a need to specify that property extends beyond land 
because the latter provisions of section 25 focused on land to a large extent. See supra note 46 at 17 for a more 
in-depth discussion of the inclusion of section 25(4). 
78 Supra note 46 at 18. 
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of the section in certain problematic instances.79 The Constitutional Assembly feared that the 
legitimacy of land reform might be eroded by the constitutional guarantee of property. 
 
Section 25(5) places a duty on the State to take ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’ to 
adopt conditions which empower citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
Section 25(6) entitles a person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result 
of previous discriminatory laws or practices by placing a duty on the State to enable such 
redress through legislation, as per section 25(9).80 Section 25(7) warrants persons or 
communities, dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices, to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. Finally,  
section 25(8) guarantees that no provision of the property clause may obstruct the State from 
taking legislative and other measures to achieve, land, water and related reform in order to 
rectify the consequences of past racial discrimination, provided that the said measures are in 
accordance with the limitation clause as per section 36. 
 
The duties emanating from section 25 were made clear by the Constitutional Court in the First 
National Bank case.81 In its judgment, the Court stated that a holistic view of the property 
clause must be adopted when interpreting it.82 This means that the property clause should not 
only be seen to be about protecting property rights, but also to be about restoring land rights. 
 
‘Section 25 was inherently designed to not only oversee the protection of property rights from 
unreasonable interference by either private parties or the State, but it was also designed in part 
to oversee and guide the constitutionally mandated attempt to reconstruct society through social 
and economic land reforms.’83 
 
This, as shown in the previous chapter, is due to the fact that the property of the majority of 




80 Legislation falling under this category would be the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, the Extension 
of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, PIE supra note 44 and the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 
31 of 1996. 
81 First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768. 
82 Ibid para 49. 
83 A J Van der Walt, S Viljoen ‘The constitutional mandate for social welfare – Systemic differences and links 
between property land rights and housing rights’ (2015) (18) PER/PELJ 4. 
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redressing this injustice by putting a duty on the State to foster conditions and promulgate 
legislation to redress the consequences of past discriminatory practices and laws.84 
 
The last tool for the interpretation of section 25, is international and foreign law. At the dawn 
of the South African constitutional dispensation, many scholars were known to have turned to 
international and foreign law to attempt to interpret section 25.85 This was for several reasons, 
but mostly because section 39(1) of the Constitution obliges courts, tribunals and forums to 
consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, and also allows the 
consideration of foreign law. South African property lawyers used comparative law as early as 
when the property clause first appeared in the 1993 Interim Constitution. Unfortunately, at the 
time, the knowledge surrounding comparative constitutional property law was limited, and 
subsequently the research in the South African landscape was unsystematic at best.86 Over 
time, the precedent and literature surrounding constitutional property law in South Africa 
became more refined, and eventually, ‘senseless’ comparative analysis ceased.87 In fact, the 
Constitutional Court, in its adjudication of recent section 25 cases, has abstained on referring 
to foreign law and when it does, it is only in passing.88 Although reference to international law 
is compulsory when it comes to interpreting rights in the Bill of Rights, case law on section 25 
only rarely refers to international law. This could be explained by the fact that the international 
community has seldom had to deal with cases involving property law, except for wide-ranging 
case law under the property provision in article 1 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention.89 Hence, although it might seem like little consideration has been given to 
international law in the interpretation of the property clause, it is due to the lack of case law 
under the international law realm of constitutional property law. 
 






84 H J Kloppers, G J Pienaar ‘The Historical Context of Land Reform in South Africa and Early Policies’ (2014) PER 
Volume 17 Number 2 680. 




89 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. It should be noted that although this pertains 
to regional international law, references to the European Convention on Human Rights is often seen as its special 
kind of foreign law. 
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Section 26(1) states that everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing while section 
26(2) imposes a positive obligation on the State to put into place legislative measures, among 
others, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing – within 
its available resources. Per the Constitutional Court in Grootboom,90 sections 26 (1) and (2) 
should be read together. The Court in Grootboom made a link between the government’s 
positive and negative obligation. In his judgment, Yacoob J. elaborates on the need for section 
26 extensively.91 He discusses the shortage of housing as being an aftermath of apartheid 
through dispossession and rigid influx control. He goes on further to say that since section 26 
cannot be seen in isolation vis-à-vis other socio-economic rights,‘the State is obliged to take 
positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness 
or intolerable housing.’92 It should be noted that the idea of housing and home has been seen 
by the Constitutional Court to include land.93 As for section 26(3), it guarantees that no one 
may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without a court order made 
after considering all the relevant circumstances. It further establishes that no legislation may 
permit arbitrary evictions. 
 
Section 26 (3) of the Constitution has been given effect to through numerous legislations: the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act,94 the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and From Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act (PIE),95 the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act,96 and the Rental 
Housing Act.97 As this dissertation refers to evictions of unlawful occupiers who have no 
prima facie relation to the land, unlike with labour tenants, only PIE is applicable and thus, 
discussed. Under PIE, vulnerable groups who are unlawfully occupying land or property are 





90 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46. 
91 Ibid para 34. 
92 Ibid para 26. 
93 Ibid para 35. 
94 Supra note 80. 
95 Supra note 44. 
96 Supra note 80. 
97 Act 50 of 1999. 
98 Section (1)(xi) of PIE provides that: 
“Unlawful occupier means a person who occupies land without the express or tacit consent of the 
owner or person in charge, or without any other right in law to occupy such land, excluding a person 
who is an occupier in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997, and excluding a person 
whose informal right to land but the provisions of this Act, would be protected by the provisions of the 
Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, 1996 (Act No. 31 of 1996).” 
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i.        PIE and its interpretation through case law 
Sections 4 and 6 of PIE provide the procedural requirements for lawful evictions. These 
requirements must be complied with by both private bodies and the State. These requirements 
are those which a court would rely on to declare that an eviction order is not ‘just and equitable’ 
and thus not capable of being granted. They can be summarised as follows. Firstly, an eviction 
order may only be applied for by the owner or person in charge of the land/property. Secondly, 
per section 4(2) of PIE, the owner must serve the occupiers with ‘written and effective notice’ 
of their intention to begin eviction proceedings, a minimum of 14 days before the court hearing. 
The notice must also be served on the municipality with jurisdiction over the property. 
 
Case law has broadened these requirements extensively. As mentioned before, section 26(3) 
states that no one may be evicted from their home without a court order authorizing such, after 
having considered ‘all the relevant circumstances’. PIE builds on this notion and states that a 
court may only grant an eviction order if the eviction would be ‘just and equitable’ given the 
circumstances. According to section 4(6) of PIE, this involves the consideration of numerous 
factors such as ‘the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households 
headed by women’. Per section 4(9), the court also ought to consider ‘the period [for which]  
the unlawful occupier and [their] family have resided on the land in question’. Whether an 
eviction order is just and equitable has been discussed in numerous cases and vastly 
supplemented. It has been established through many of these cases that a court would not be 
able to decide whether an eviction order is just and equitable if it were not provided with all 
the information necessary to come to this conclusion.99 
 
The onus of proof in these proceedings has also been changed by case law. Generally, the party 
seeking relief must show the veracity of a particular set of facts. Thus, under common law, the 
property owner needed to show that the land was indeed theirs, and that they had not given 
consent to the occupiers nor did the latter have any right to live on said piece of land. Now 





99 Supra note 2 para 32; Sailing Queen Investments v Occupants La Colleen Court 2008 (6) BCLR 666 (W) paras 
11, 14, 18 and 19; City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA) paras 26 
and 27; Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2010 (4) BCLR 354 (SCA) para 11; and The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, 
Johannesburg v Steele [2010] ZASCA 28 para 10. 
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Changing Tides,100 the owner also needs to put such information before the Court to illustrate 
that the eviction would be just and equitable under the circumstances. 
 
South African courts’ jurisprudence also clarified whether the distinction between section 4(6) 
and (7) with respect to the provision of alternative accommodation was acceptable.101 In 
Shulana Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that, although there were textual differences 
between sections 4(6) and (7), nothing suggested that the Court was not allowed to consider 
the availability of alternative accommodation in cases where the occupiers had been on the 
property for less than six months.102 This was later established by the Constitutional Court in 
Skurweplaas and Mooiplaats.103 Thus, the distinction was thereby obliterated. With respect to 
alternative accommodation, the Constitutional Court in Blue Moonlight confirmed the City’s 
obligation to provide such in situations where private owners seek evictions.104 
 
Perhaps more interestingly, the development in eviction jurisprudence which has made a 
significant difference in practice is the need for ‘meaningful engagement’. The concept was 
first developed by the Constitutional Court in PE Municipality. While this is a simple concept, 
involving mediation between parties coupled with earnest engagement about possible 
solutions, it is also quite innovative. Due to the nature of eviction proceedings, and the interests 
at heart, an eviction might not be just and equitable unless ‘proper discussions and, where 
fitting, mediation were not attempted’.105 The concept was expanded on in 51 Olivia Road 




101 Section 4(6) of PIE states: 
“If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for less than six months at the time when 
the proceedings are initiated, a court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just 
and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances, including the rights and needs 
of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women.” (Emphasis added). 
Section 4(7) of PIE reads: 
“If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for more than six months at the time when 
the proceedings are initiated, a court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just 
and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances, including, except where the 
land is sold in a sale of execution pursuant to a mortgage, whether land has been made available or can 
reasonably be made available by a municipality or other organ of state or another land owner for the 
relocation of the unlawful occupier, and including the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled 
persons and households headed by women.” (Emphasis added). 
102 Shulana Court supra note 99 para 13. 
103 Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd and Others [2011] ZACC 36 and Occupiers 
of Portion R25 of the Farm Mooiplaats 355 JR v Golden Thread Ltd and Others 2012 (2) SA 337 (CC). 
104 Blue Moonlight supra note 5 para 95. 
105 Supra note 2 para 43. 
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which flows from section 26(2) of the Constitution.106 Since then, meaningful engagement has 
been a requirement in eviction proceedings and in the Joe Slovo case, the Constitutional Court 
highlighted the importance of this requirement, albeit through five separate concurring 
judgments.107 Another significant development in the housing and eviction case law was the 
recently acclaimed judgment of the Constitutional Court in the Berea case, where the Court 
confirmed that evictions which lead to homelessness are unlawful and that courts have a 
positive obligation to consider all relevant circumstances in those cases.108 It was emphasized 
by the Court that even when said evictions are agreed upon by the occupiers, they are still 
deemed unlawful.109 
 
Hence, other than the requirements codified under PIE, there are numerous other factors which 
need to be considered by the Court for an eviction order to be considered just and equitable. 
 
(d) Analysis of the relationship between sections 25 and 26 
 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, section 25(1) of the Constitution is the pivotal provision. 
This section holds that ‘no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application’. The requirement of ‘law of general application’ has mostly been interpreted in the 
context of section 36 of the Constitution. Literature on the subject deciphered this phrase as a 
law which ought to be ‘properly adopted’ and which applies indiscriminately. 110 Safe to say 
that the unlawful occupation of land is not a law, and thus there is no need to engage with this 
requirement at length. While PIE is a law of general application, it should be borne in mind 
that section 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE do not afford unlawful occupiers right to be on 
the land. Instead, section 26(3) and PIE give the unlawful occupiers a defense against being 
evicted arbitrarily from their homes. The main concern is whether unlawful occupation of land 
 
 
106 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and 
Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
107 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) (Joe 
Slovo). Joe Slovo leaves open the discussion of whether meaningful engagement ought to happen before or after 
the eviction order has been sought. It seems more plausible, as established in Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement 
SA and Another v Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal and Others 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) paras 69 and 120 
that if meaningful engagement were to take place after an eviction order was sought, said engagement might 
not be deemed to be sincere. 
108 Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea v De Wet N.O. and Another 2017 (5) SA 346 (CC) (Berea). 
109 Ibid. 
110 B V Sade ‘The ‘law of general application’ requirement in expropriation law and the impact of the 
Expropriation Bill of 2015’ (2017) De Jure (Pretoria) vol 50 n 2. 
28 
 
amounts to the landowner’s deprivation. The Constitutional Court in First National Bank held 
that “any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property involves some 
deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in the property concerned.”111 
Unlawful occupation of land would easily fall under this broad category as it involves the 
possession, use, enjoyment and arguably exploitation of private property. As the term indicates, 
unlawful occupation is evidently not a law and thus cannot be saved by the exception of ‘law 
of general application’ under section 25. Thus, unlawful occupation amounts to deprivation of 
property, which is not protected under the Constitution, as has been confirmed in Modderklip 
SCA and will be expanded on later. 
 
Ultimately, what can be found from the various eviction and housing cases is that the 
requirement to only make an order for eviction if the latter is just and equitable has the potential 
to limit the right to property. This was hinted at in PE Municipality and confirmed in Blue 
Moonlight.112 Although not mentioned outright by the Constitutional Court in Modderklip, the 
landowner’s right to property was significantly limited. Even if one were to not consider the 
act of unlawful land occupation, it is obvious that the provision of housing depends on the 
availability of land. To think about the provision of housing without thinking about facilitating 
land ownership or occupation, would be to put the proverbial cart before the horse. Thus, in 
the most elementary sense, the right to property and the State’s duty to achieve transformation 
through remedying land dispossession is inextricably linked to the right to access to housing. 
In addition to this, in practice, it has become evident that section 26 has limited and will 
continue to limit landowners’ right to property in cases where evictions are not just and 
equitable. In these cases, unlawful occupiers would acquire a momentary, limited right of 
occupation ‘which persists for as long as the State does not perform its obligations to provide  
temporary shelter.’113 
 
Some might say that this creates a tension between sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution. 
However, the Constitutional Court has said time and time again that the Constitution ‘is one 
composite whole. As such, it could not have been framed to be contradictory.’114 Thus, one 
 
111 Supra note 81 para 57. 
112 Blue Moonlight supra note 5. 
113 S Wilson ‘Breaking the Tie: Evictions from Private Land, Homelessness and the New Normality’ (2009) 126(2) 
South African Law Journal 289. 
114 New Nation Movement NPC and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2020 (6) SA 
257 (CC) para 63. 
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cannot assume that the Constitution is contradictory.115 While often different individual rights 
are at odds with each other in practice, their interpretation should not be done in such a way. 
One is perfectly capable to interpret both rights in a way that is not contradictory. It is only in 
cases of unlawful occupation of private land that the rights operate against each other. 
However, this is not determinative of a tension but rather a relationship between the two rights. 
 
(e) Conclusion 
Due to the above developments in housing and eviction jurisprudence, private landowners do 
not necessarily enjoy the same privileges as they used to before the advent of constitutional 
dispensation. It is clear from the above analysis that eviction cases give rise to the potential 
infringements of two rights: the right of the landowner to not be deprived of property save by 
law of general application, and the right of the unlawful occupier to not be arbitrarily evicted 
from their home. This could lead to a misconstrued belief that there is a tension between the 
two rights. However, as will be seen from the next Chapter, the argument that the operation of 
the rights to property and to access to housing is indicative of a special relationship between 
the two is clear from the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in eviction cases. The next  
Chapter will discuss how the Constitutional Court has dealt with this intersection between 
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPERTY AND HOUSING RIGHTS 
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
As seen from the previous chapter, sections 25 and 26 have a peculiar relationship. Yet, while 
one would think that, given the high number of eviction cases which have culminated at the 
Constitutional Court, there would be lengthy discussions in each case on the intersection of 
these two rights, this is unfortunately not the case. As of now, the Constitutional Court has only 
ever discussed the interaction between property and housing rights in two cases: PE 
Municipality and Modderklip. In both cases, these discussions were not extensive, but they are 
nonetheless informative for the purposes of this dissertation and consequently, this chapter will 
discuss the relationship between the two rights through the lens of the Constitutional Court. 
Due to the importance of the case and the relevance of the facts and the remedy, this Chapter 
will also reflect on the High Court’s judgment and the Supreme Court of Appeal’s order in the 
Fischer case. This discussion will serve as a survey of the court’s general approach to ordering 
judicial expropriation as a remedy in cases where evictions would be unjust and inequitable, in 
an effort to assess whether such a remedy has been considered as plausible by the judiciary. 
 
(a) PE Municipality 
 
 
In the year 2000, motivated by a petition signed by 1600 people in the neighbourhood, the Port 
Elizabeth Municipality approached the South Eastern Cape Local Division of the High Court 
seeking an eviction order against the respondents, 68 people including 23 children.116 The 
respondents had erected 29 shacks on privately owned land within the Municipality’s territory. 
The respondents purported that they had remained on the land for periods stretching between 
two to eight years and had relocated there after having been evicted from another property. 
According to the Municipality, the occupied land was zoned for residential purposes and the 
occupiers erected their shacks without the Municipality’s consent. The occupiers stated that, 
should suitable alternative land be found, they were not opposed to relocating. The 
Municipality in turn offered to move them to a location known as Walmer Township (Walmer). 
However, the occupiers declined to move to Walmer, stating it was not safe, was over-crowded 




116 Supra note 2. 
117 It should be noted that, at no stage, had the occupiers applied to the Municipality for housing. 
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The Municipality retorted that, although it was conscious of its duty to provide housing, 
providing alternative land to the occupiers would amount to preferential treatment and ‘queue- 
jumping’. This term is commonly raised by the State in cases where they are required to provide 
alternative accommodation to prospective evictees who have not applied for housing. It relies 
on the notion that ‘there is a “waiting list system” which constitutes a housing “queue”, and 
that people must wait patiently until their name is chosen in terms of a rational process of “first 
come first served”.’118 This prevailing discourse around housing delivery contains numerous 
fallacies which will be exposed in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to point out that this 
was the Municipality’s main argument. The High Court found for the Municipality and held 
that it was in the public’s interest that an end be put to the unlawful occupation and thus, 
accordingly granted the eviction order. 
 
The occupiers knocked on the doors of the Supreme Court of Appeal, seeking to have the lower 
court’s judgment overturned. The SCA established that the occupiers were not trying to obtain 
favourable treatment as they were not asking for housing to be allocated to them at the expense 
of the people in the housing queue. Instead, the occupiers were simply asking for alternative 
land to be identified for them to relocate without the risk of being evicted again. Having 
considered numerous factors, including the length of time during which the land was occupied, 
the suitability of the alternative land and the lack of prospective security of tenure of the 
occupiers in Walmer, the SCA held that the alternative land was not suitable. The SCA found 
that the High Court should not have granted the eviction order without a guarantee from the 
Municipality that the occupiers’ tenure security would be respected. Thus, the eviction order 
was set aside. Disappointed by this outcome, the Municipality knocked on the doors of the 
Constitutional Court to overturn the SCA’s judgment as well as to establish once and for all 
that it is not a constitutional requirement for the State to provide alternative accommodation or 
land in eviction cases. 
 
In a unanimous judgment penned by Sachs J., the Court fleshed out the requirements under PIE 
and explained the different circumstances under which a court should be more inclined towards 
ordering an eviction and when it should be more cautious in evicting occupiers. The Court went 
to great lengths to explain that ‘the eviction process is not automatic and … the courts are 
 
 
118 K Tissington, N Munshi, G Mirugi-Mukundi and E Durojaye ‘’Jumping the Queue’, Waiting Lists and other 
Myths: Perceptions and Practice around Housing Demand and Allocation in South Africa’ (2013) SERI Report 6. 
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called upon to exercise a broad judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis.’119 The Court 
applied the different factors required by PIE to the relevant circumstances of the occupation 
and found that it was not persuaded that it would be just and equitable to order the eviction of 
the occupiers.120 Thus, it dismissed the application for leave to appeal. 
 
Based only on this brief account of the facts of the case and the outcome, the reader might not 
grasp the importance of this case. However, van der Walt had the following to say about how 
seminal PE Municipality was for constitutional property law. 
 
‘The new logic described in PE Municipality should guide the [process of development of the 
common law in line with section 39(2) of the Constitution]. The point of departure cannot be 
that existing, vested or acquired rights necessarily trump no-right interests or weaker rights, or 
that existing, vested and acquired rights have to be insulated against regulatory limitation at all 
cost.’121 
 
While this judgment is not often praised, most probably due to its uneventful outcome, van der 
Walt’s statement is undoubtedly accurate: the judgment indicated a ‘fundamental shift from 
abstract, rights-based to [a] contextual, non-hierarchical thinking about property rights.’122 
This ‘fundamental shift’ occurred through an analysis of PIE in contrast to its predecessor, the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (PISA).123 The Court explains how PIE was intentionally 
crafted so as to be diametrically opposed to PISA, by decriminalizing unlawful occupation of 
land and by ‘temper[ing] common law remedies with strong procedural and substantive 
protections; and … facilitating the displacement and relocation of poor and landless black  
people for ideological purposes was replaced by acknowledgement of the necessitous quest for 
homes of victims of past racist policies.’124 The judgment highlights the fact that PISA only 
required the determination of one question: whether the occupation of the land was lawful. If 






119 Supra note 2 para 31. 
120 Ibid para 59. 
121 Supra note 46 at 526-7. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Act 52 of 1951. 
124 Supra note 2 para 12. 
125 Supra note 2 para 8. 
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PISA, along with many other Acts, ensured that Black people could only live in certain areas 
cordoned for them, and apartheid state planning was thereby safeguarded. The Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation of PIE and explanation of the shift from PISA, in PE Municipality, set a 
powerful precedent: property rights would no longer automatically trump occupiers’ interests. 
The Constitutional Court thus stripped property rights of what was left of its once sacrosanct 
status. On a more conceptual level, the judgment emphasizes that, along with the replacement 
of PISA with PIE, there should be a significant shift in the way in which unlawful occupation 
should be regarded. The unlawful occupiers should be treated with dignity, and as the Court 
put it, eviction which was a ‘former depersonalized process that took no account of the life 
circumstances of those being expelled’ should now be a ‘humanized procedure that focused on 
fairness to all’.126 
 
However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the importance of this judgment lies in the fact 
that PE Municipality is the first Constitutional Court judgment to discuss the intersection 
between property and housing rights. The Court does so by considering the ‘broad 
constitutional matrix for the interpretation of PIE’.127 In simpler terms, the judgment sets out 
the bigger picture in which property rights, housing rights, homelessness and landlessness 
operate, and establishes how PIE fits in this machinery. This part of the judgment grounds the 
discourse as it explains that the ‘broad constitutional matrix’ and the purpose behind its 
existence points to the attempt to undo a racist past, the consequences of which have not yet 
been erased. Sachs J. considered the history of forced evictions in the apartheid era, 
emphasizing on the need for context when interpreting constitutional rights. He stated that the 
role of PIE was in two parts, ‘people once regarded as anonymous squatters now became 
entitled to dignified and individualized treatment with special consideration for the most 
vulnerable… while the second part of the title established that unlawful occupation was also to 
be prevented.’128 
 
This judgment is the first to delve into the juxtaposition of the right to not be arbitrarily evicted, 
the right to access to adequate housing and the right to not be deprived of one’s property. The 




126 Supra note 2 para 14. 
127 Ibid para 14. 
128 Ibid para 8. 
34 
 
an appropriate constitutional relationship between sections 25 and 26.’129 Sachs J. sets out the 
framework in which these rights should operate and be interpreted when they interact with each 
other and limit one another. The judgment also considers the property clause and establishes 
that property rights under section 25 must be considered particularly in this context because of 
the ‘blatant disregard manifested by racist statutes for property rights in the past.’130 Thus, 
Sachs J. discusses subsections (4) to (9) of section 25, highlighting their aims to redress ‘one 
of the most enduring legacies of racial discrimination in the past, namely the grossly unequal 
distribution of land in South Africa’.131 He does so by referring to Ackermann J.’s judgment in 
First National Bank.132 Endorsing van det Walt’s stance on the interpretation of section 25, 
namely that ‘the purpose of section 25 has to be seen both as protecting existing private 
property rights as well as serving the public interest’.133 He ties the transformative nature of 
subsections (4) to (9) of section 25 to the reason for the incorporation of section 26 of the 
Constitution, stating that the two create a wide overlap between land rights and socio-economic 
rights, as accepted in Grootboom.134 Thus, the Court adopted van der Walt’s approach that 
when a court considers the aim and content of the property clause, one should: 
 
‘…move away from a static, typically private-law conceptualist view of the constitution as a 
guarantee of the status quo to a dynamic, typically public-law view of the constitution as an 
instrument of social change and transformation under the auspices of entrenched constitutional 
values.’135 
 
After elaborating on the interpretation of both sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution, Sachs J. 
establishes that ‘the Constitution recognizes that land rights and the right of access the housing 
and of not being arbitrarily evicted, are closely intertwined.’136 The Court here acknowledges 
the continuum of tenure rights by stating that ‘the stronger the right to land, the greater the 
prospect of a secure home’.137 This statement echoes the fact that the people who are more 
vulnerable to evictions are those who have temporary rights in land and low tenure security. 
This statement concretizes the notion that through the spectrum of tenure rights, from being 
 
129 Ibid para 19. 
130 Ibid para 16. 
131 Ibid para 16. 
132 Supra note 81. 
133 Supra note 2 para 16. 
134 Supra note 90 para 74. 
135 Supra note 2 para 16. 




evicted to obtaining strong tenure security, sections 25 and 26 in the Constitution are, in many 
ways, closely linked. 
 
The Court also highlights that, in its interactions with each other in the context of evictions, 
sections 25 and 26 need to be balanced against each other. The need for this balancing exercise, 
on a case-by-case basis is emphasized throughout the judgment and its importance is re-iterated 
as it was the main change brought about by PIE: the consideration of personal circumstances 
in the balancing exercise,138 as opposed to ownership rights trumping occupiers’ interests. The 
Court also considered the role of courts in the balancing exercise between the multiple rights 
and interests at play in eviction proceedings. In his judgment, Sachs J. held that the judicial 
function is to ‘balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible,  
taking account of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular 
case.’139 
 
According to section 6(3)(a) to (c) of PIE, courts should take into account factors including, 
the circumstances of the occupation of the land; the period for which the unlawful occupier 
and their family have been on the land; and the availability of a suitable alternative 
accommodation or land. When judging on all these factors, Sachs J. held that PIE ‘expressly 
requires the court to infuse elements of grace and compassion into the formal structures of the 
law.’ 140 He also went on to say the following about the courts’ role in adjudication of eviction 
cases. 
 
‘The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical arrangement  
between the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and mechanical way the 
rights of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather it is 
to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account 
of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case.’141 
 




138 Per section 6 of PIE, the establishment of the facts that the occupation is either unsafe, unhealthy or 
unauthorised does not mean the court should make an eviction order, rather, it ‘triggers’ the court’s discretion. 
The court must only grant an eviction when it is just and equitable to do so. 
139 Supra note 2 para 23. 
140 Ibid para 37. 





‘[The Constitution] counterposes to the normal ownership rights of possession, use and 
occupation, a new and equally relevant right not arbitrarily to be deprived of a home. The 
expectations that normally go with title could clash head-on with the genuine despair of people 
in dire need of accommodation.’142 
 
While such a statement is laudable, the nature of the rights at stake will be kept in mind by any 
court which engages in a balancing of the rights. When the unlawful occupier is on a piece of 
land under circumstances which allows them to fall under the scope of protection of PIE, the 
occupier develops an interest in the land. This interest that is developed in the land is at most 
temporary, and will almost never succeed against the right of ownership of the owner of the 
said piece of land.143 That being said, this drives the importance of PE Municipality home. PE 
Municipality does not aim to change the nature of these rights but rather, the hierarchy at which 
the rights are seen. The rights of the landowner no longer take automatic precedence over those 
of the occupiers. Instead, a balancing exercise is at play and the latter requires the courts to 
take into consideration various factors. While in most occasions the exercise will still likely 
tend towards an eviction of the unlawful occupiers because of their temporary interests, there 
are many instances where these evictions will be delayed in an effort for alternative 
accommodation to be secured in the meantime. This helps to ensure that both sections 25(1) 
and 26(3) are complied with. However, there are certain cases where eviction orders are 





In 2000, Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Modderklip) was alerted by the local city council of 
the occupation of its farm. The occupiers were people who had been previously evicted from 
an informal settlement close to the farm. Instead of instituting eviction proceedings under PIE, 
Modderklip believed that it was the duty of the municipality to do so. After laying charges 
against the occupiers for trespassing and getting them convicted, the occupiers were released, 
and went back to occupying the land. The local head of the prison proceeded to request both 
 
142 Ibid. 
143 In fact, it is clear from the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on evictions that the primary interest which 
they value is not security of tenure for the occupiers but rather, that the occupiers are not rendered homeless 
by the eviction. See Blue Moonlight supra note 5 para 34; supra note 69 paras 20–22, 28; Modderklip CC supra 
note 5 para 46; Occupiers of Skurweplaas supra note 103 para 11; and Berea supra note 108 para 79. 
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Modderklip and representatives of South African Police Force (SAPS) to not engage in further 
criminal prosecutions as the prison did not have enough space to house all the unlawful 
occupiers in the event that they be sentenced to prison terms.144 
 
The applicant thus approached the Witwatersrand Local division of the High Court. At the 
time, the occupation had not been in effect for more than six months and there were 400 
occupiers. There were more delays and, by the time the case was heard, the number of occupiers 
had grown to 15 000. When the application was lodged at the Gauteng High Court, the High 
Court was most probably under the impression that this would be yet another run of the mill 
eviction case, which would explain the short six-page judgment.145 In its judgment ordering for 
the occupiers to be evicted and their shacks demolished, the High Court found that the 
occupiers knew the land was owned privately and moved onto the land without the consent of 
the owner and that, in the absence of any law requiring the land owner to provide housing for 
the occupiers, the occupiers did not have any right to enforce against the land owner.146 Having 
considered the various circumstances, the High Court held that the occupiers ought to be 
evicted. 
 
An eviction order was issued by the Witwatersrand Local Division and authorized the Sheriff 
to enlist SAPS to help with the eviction and the removal or demolition of their informal 
dwellings.147 Yet, SAPS refused to assist as it believed that the matter was a civil one 
concerning the respondent and occupiers only. The Sheriff was forced to reach out to a private 
security company which asked for a deposit of R 1.8 million. As this amount was much higher 
than the price of the land which was being unlawfully occupied, Modderklip did not entertain 
the offer. Instead, Modderklip approached the Minister of Safety and Security, the Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs and the Minister of Housing, as well as the President, but received 




144 Modderklip CC supra note 5 para 5. 
145 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters And Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) (the eviction case). 
Perhaps, it could have been an easy judgment, had it only been decided on private law. This is certainly the way 
in which the State and the South African Police Service (SAPS) approached the matter. 
146 Ibid at 394. 
147 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die RSA en Andere 2003 (6) BCLR 638 (T) (the enforcement 
case). 
148 It is significant to note that, by then, the settlement was known as the Gabon settlement and despite the 





Eventually, Modderklip went to the Pretoria High Court where both itself and the amicus 
curiae, AgriSA, conceded that the unconditional removal of the occupiers was not an option.149 
Modderklip sought a declaratory order stating that its property right under section 25(1) and 
equality rights under sections 9(1) and (2) had been violated, as well as the unlawful occupiers’ 
right to housing under section 26. SAPS opposed the application and argued that the issue was 
not one which concerned the police but rather one of land reform. Relying on the expense of 
R18 million which would be required to implement the eviction order, SAPS contended that 
the eviction was not practical. Yet, the High Court made an order to the effect that the 
applicant’s right to not be deprived of their property per section 25(1) of the Constitution had 
been infringed. Additionally, the High Court held that the State had an obligation under 
sections 26(1) and (2) of the Constitution, read with section 25(5), to take reasonable steps to 
realise the occupiers’ right to access to adequate housing. Interestingly, the High Court also 
relied on section 165(4) of the Constitution to underscore the need for court orders to be 
complied with, and for the rule of law to be respected.150 Hence, the State was ordered to put 
forward a comprehensive plan in front of the High Court on how it would implement the 
eviction order. The High Court had thus granted, per sections 38 and 172(1) of the Constitution, 
a declaratory order and a mandamus in the form of a structural interdict.151 
 
Both the eviction and enforcement cases were appealed to the SCA by Modder East Squatters 
and the State respectively,152 and four amici curiae were admitted.153 Both matters were 
consolidated and heard in May 2004. There, it became clearer that despite its various efforts, 
the State was unable to prove that Modderklip’s delay in bringing the eviction application to 
Court was unreasonable and even culpable, nor that Modderklip should therefore suffer the 
consequences of that delay as opposed to the State being called upon to explain its non- 
compliance to the High Court’s order.154 In fact, it came to light that the Municipality had its 
role to play in causing Modderklip to be delayed in instituting the eviction proceedings. 
 
149 Supra note 147. 
150 Section 165(4) of the Constitution reads: “Organs of State, through legislative and other measures, must assist 
and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the 
courts.” 
151 Supra note 147 para 39. A structural interdict is an order under which the relevant court will exercise 
supervisory jurisdiction over the organ of state concerned. 
152 Supra note 147. 
153 The amici were AgriSA, Nkuzi Development Association, Community Law Centre (University of the Western 
Cape) and Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS, University of Western Cape). 





In May 2000, the Municipality had made Modderklip aware of the occupation of the farm 
through a letter instructing the latter to institute proceedings to evict the occupiers as per PIE.155 
As the occupation arose out of previous evictions carried out by the Municipality and was due 
to overcrowding in surround informal settlements,156 Modderklip believed that it had no 
responsibility in evicting the occupiers and that it should be the Municipality’s responsibility 
instead.157 Ignoring Modderklip’s response, the Municipality approached Modderklip and they 
entered into negotiations regarding the sale of the two portions of land which were occupied. 
In June, an offer was made by Modderklip, to which the Municipality only responded in 
August. The Municipality indicated that they would only be prepared to purchase the land at 
the suggested price during the next financial year, under specific conditions. Although 
Modderklip had agreed to the Municipality’s stipulations, a week later the latter indicated that 
it was not interested in purchasing the said plots of land anymore and that Modderklip should 
apply for the eviction of the unlawful occupiers. Since Modderklip had to obtain expert 
evidence regarding the health hazards caused by the informal settlement developing on their 
land, it was only able to launch the eviction proceedings in October 2000.158 It can be clearly 
observed that Modderklip was not solely responsible for the delay in launching the eviction 
proceedings. Additionally, the SCA held that it was unclear whether Modderklip would have 
been able to satisfy all the rigorous requirements of section 5 of PIE even if it had launched the 
urgent procedures.159 
 
The SCA, in its judgment, expressed its qualms about the structural interdict, explaining that 
the interdict could potentially breach the principle of separation of powers and that the time 
limit set by the Court for the State to comply with the order was unrealistic.160 In addition to 
several other defects, the SCA held that, in granting that order, the High Court was in effect 
prioritizing the development of the Gabon settlement which might seem to rubberstamp queue- 
jumping. The SCA thought this to be highly inappropriate and referred to the Constitutional 
 
 
155 Ibid para 35. 
156 It would seem that this case goes back to the 1990s. Several residents moved out of the overcrowded 
Daveyton Township and established the Chris Hani informal settlement on a nearby strip of municipal land. In 
May 2000, they were evicted from the Chris Hani informal settlement and approximately 400 of the evictees 
settled on Modderklip’s land under the erroneous belief that it was owned by the Municipality; supra note 147. 
157 Supra note 147. 
158 Ibid para 38. 
159 Modderklip CC supra note 5 para 30. 
160 Ibid para 39. 
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Court’s statement on self-help and land invasions in the Grootboom judgment.161 But instead 
of merely criticizing the order of the High Court, the SCA acknowledged the predicament that 
the parties found themselves in, since the eviction order was, simply put, impossible to enforce. 
As there was no alternative land identified by the Municipality, it was not feasible to evict 
40 000 occupiers since they would either return back to the land or occupy another plot of land, 
and the State would be faced with the same problem except in another area. 
 
Faced with this dilemma, the SCA emphasized the need for courts to be creative but practical 
when crafting effective remedies. Since the occupiers could not be evicted, they would have to 
remain on Modderklip’s land and hence, return of the land would be impossible.162 This would 
be a continuing infringement of Modderklip’s right to property under section 25, as it would 
effectively constitute a deprivation of property.163 As the SCA found that the State was seen to 
have infringed the property rights of Modderklip under section 25(1) read with section 7(2) of 
the Constitution,164 in addition to the section 26 rights of the unlawful occupier, it opted for an 
order against the State to pay constitutional damages to Modderklip, so that the ‘Gabon 
occupiers [could] remain where they [were] while Modderklip [would] be recompensed for 
that which it has lost and the State [had] gained by not providing alternative land.’165. More 
interestingly, the SCA stated that, ‘Although in an ideal world the State would have 
expropriated the land and have taken over its burden, which now rests on Modderklip, it is 
questionable whether a court may order an organ of State to expropriate property.’166 
 
The SCA thereby left the question open and instead ordered, inter alia, that ‘the residents were 
entitled to occupy the land until alternative land had been made available to them by the State 
or the provincial or local authority’ and for damages ‘to be calculated in terms of section 12(1) 
of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975’. 167 To its credit, the SCA approached this matter head- 
on and attempted to resolve the million-dollar question: ‘How to approach and solve a direct 
 
 
161 Ibid para 16. 
162 Ibid para 43. 
163 The SCA, surprisingly, did not discuss whether the occupation constituted a deprivation of Modderklip’s 
property or rather amounted to a constructive expropriation which will be explained later. It would seem that 
the SCA endorsed De Villiers J’s analysis that “the refusal of the occupiers to obey the eviction order amounted 
to a breach of Modderklip’s right under section 25(1)”. This will be discussed further in the following chapter.  
164 Section 7(2) reads as follows: 
“The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.” 
165 Supra note 147 para 43. 
166 Ibid para 41. 
167 Ibid at para 52(b)(iii) and (iv). 
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clash between landownership and the right not to be evicted, combined with the right to access 
to housing?’.168 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Constitutional Court decided to take on a 
completely different approach. 
 
The State approached the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal, the President of the Republic 
of South Africa, being the first applicant and the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, the 
second.169 Modderklip was the respondent and the same amici which were present at the SCA 
were admitted at this stage of litigation. In the Constitutional Court, the State persisted with 
the argument that Modderklip’s delay in launching the eviction proceeds was culpable.170 It 
argued that, under section 5 of PIE, timeous launch of eviction proceedings was a requirement 
and that the evictions would have otherwise been affordable and manageable. The 
Constitutional Court upheld the SCA’s finding that Modderklip’s delay was not culpable and 
that the latter had not neglected to assert its rights of ownership from the get-go, as required by 
Mkontwana for there to be culpability.171 The judgment emphasized that the Municipality was 
also empowered under section 6(1) of PIE to institute eviction proceedings once Modderklip 
declined to do so.172 
 
Another argument made by the State was that section 25(1) could not be relied on since the 
unlawful occupiers’ conduct was not one envisaged by the constitutional provision. Rather, 
they argued that section 25(1) had no horizontal application and thus could not govern relations 
between private parties.173 The Constitutional Court held that it was of no use debating the 
horizontal application of section 25 in this matter, while the SCA had made inconclusive and 
superficial observations about its horizontal application.174 The SCA seemed to accept the 
reference to direct horizontal application but then rephrased the enforcement order to highlight 
the fact that it was the State which infringed on Modderklip’s property right by not 
 
 
168 AJ Van der Walt, “The State’s Duty to Protect Owners v The State’s Duty to Provide Housing: Thoughts on 
Modderklip Case”, South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 21, no. 1, 2005, p 146. 
169 By the time this matter reached the Constitutional Court, approximately 50 hectares of Modderklip’s land 
was being unlawfully occupied. 
170 Modderklip CC supra note 5 para 22. 
171 Ibid at para 31; Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v 
Buffalo City Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and Others (Kwazulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as amici curiae) 2005 (1) 
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173 Ibid para 23. 
174 Ibid para 26. 
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implementing housing policies which led to the occupiers unlawfully being on Modderklip’s 
land.175 Van der Walt believes that much thought should not be given to the High Court and 
SCA’s approach to the horizontal application of section 25 as it was most likely superficially 
considered.176 
 
In addition to those arguments, the Constitutional Court addressed various issues, namely those 
of access to justice, appropriate constitutional remedies and access to adequate housing for the 
vulnerable. The judgment poignantly reminds the reader of the reason why the unlawful 
occupiers found themselves in this position in the first place: due to the failure of the State to 
meet its duty in the provision of housing (or at least alternative accommodation following the 
first evictions) to the unlawful occupiers. The Constitutional Court also poignantly addressed 
the original sin: 
 
‘The problem of homelessness is particularly acute in our society. It is a direct consequence of 
apartheid urban planning which sought to exclude African people from urban areas, and 
enforced this vision through policies regulating access to land and housing which meant that 
far too little land and too few houses were supplied to African people. The painful consequences 
of these policies are still with us eleven years into our new democracy, despite government’s 
attempts to remedy them. The frustration and helplessness suffered by many who still struggle 
against heavy odds to meet the challenge merely to survive and to have shelter can never be 
underestimated. The fact that poverty and homelessness still plague many South Africans is a 
painful reminder of the chasm that still needs to be bridged before the constitutional ideal to 
establish a society based on social justice and improved quality of life for all citizens is fully 
achieved.’177 
 
The Court highlighted that the situation was extraordinary, and even though the State could not 
turn to usual mechanisms to execute the eviction order, it still bore the duty to provide access 
to alternative accommodation. The Constitutional Court extricated itself from the situation of 
having to discuss the possibility of judicial expropriation by instead turning to the rights and 





175 Supra note 8 para 21. 
176 Supra note 168 at 152. 
177 Moddeklip CC supra note 5 para 36. 
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the intersections of sections 25 and 26,178 the Court emphasized on the duty of the State to 
provide citizens with the required mechanisms for the resolution of disputes.179 Relying on 
sections 1(c) and 34 of the Constitution, the Court stated that this duty is an aspect which flows 
from the rule of law.180 The Court further relied on Chief Lesapo where Mokgoro J pointed 
that: 
 
‘[t]he right of access to court is indeed foundational to the stability of an orderly society. It 
ensures the peaceful, regulated and institutionalised mechanisms to resolve disputes, without 
resorting to self-help. The right of access to court is a bulwark against vigilantism, and the 
chaos and anarchy which it causes. Construed in this context of the rule of law and the principle 
against self-help in particular, access to court is indeed of cardinal importance. As a result, very 
powerful considerations would be required for its limitation to be reasonable and justifiable.’181 
 
The Constitutional Court relied almost exclusively on the duty of the State to comply with the 
rule of law to find that the State was in breach of said duty in this matter. Hence, the 
Constitutional Court upheld the finding that constitutional damages were the appropriate relief 
but reached that conclusion through other means. Of interest to this dissertation, the 
Constitutional Court also addressed the arguments for the Court to order the State to 
expropriate the occupied land. It stated that ‘the Expropriation Act, in particular section 2 
thereof, seems to reserve the decision to expropriate for the Minister of Public Works’.182 It 
however avoided reaching a conclusion on the question, by finding that ‘it [was] not necessary 
to decide, in this case, whether or not a court can order the expropriation of property.’183 In 
doing so, the Constitutional Court thereby granted the application for leave to appeal and 
dismissed the appeal in part. Save for the costs order by the SCA, the other parts of order were 
set aside and replaced by the Constitutional Court. 
 
178 Ibid para 26, where the Constitutional Court said that it finds it “unnecessary in this case to reach any 
conclusion on whether Modderklip’s section 25(1) right to property and the rights of the unlawful occupiers 
under sections 26(1) and (2) have been breached and if so, to what extent.” 
179 Ibid para 39. 
180 Section 1(c) reads: 
“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic State founded on the following values: 
(c) Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.” 
Section 34 reads: 
“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a 
fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal 
or forum.” 
181 Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) at para 22. 
182 Modderklip CC supra note 5 para 63. 





It is interesting to note that the SCA’s approach in Modderklip SCA was in line with that of the 
Constitutional Court in PE Municipality where the section 25 rights of the landowner was 
balanced against the section 26 rights of the unlawful occupiers.184 The SCA’s approach to this 
matter was progressive with respect to how far it was developing jurisprudence on the 
intersection of sections 25 and 26. Avoiding the issue of the horizontal application of section 
25 of the Constitution, the SCA relied on two aspects to hold the State accountable for the 
infringement of Modderklip’s section 25(1) right. The SCA held that it was the State’s failure 
to provide adequate housing to the occupiers which made it impossible to enforce the execution 
order.185 Additionally, the SCA found that the State failed to uphold the duties that it owed to 
both the landowner and the occupiers under section 7(2) of the Constitution, and was thus 
responsible for the constitutional infringement in this case.186 This was an innovative approach 
to avoiding the question of the horizontal application of section 25, while still finding the State 
liable for the constitutional infringement. It was also novel in that it, in a way, presupposed that 
the promotion of the occupiers’ section 26 rights would protect the landowner’s section 25  
rights.187 This takes the intersection of the two rights further, as it now creates an abstract co- 
dependent relationship. This will be one of the founding blocks for the later argument in favour 
of courts ordering expropriation in such cases. 
 
As opposed to the SCA, the Constitutional Court shied away from making any such progressive 
steps towards the development of the relationship between sections 25 and 26. However, one 
could not fault the Constitutional Court for doing so when the route of sections 1(c) and 34 
could achieve the same purpose but in a less complicated manner. Sadly, for the purposes of 
this dissertation, readers were robbed of the Constitutional Court’s views on the relationship  
between sections 25 and 26 when the eviction order is unenforceable, and on whether courts 
can order expropriation. Another such instance where lawyers hoped to have these questions 
answered by the SCA or even, at some stage, the Constitutional Court was the case of Fischer. 
 
184 Supra note 62 and supra note 168 at 150. 
185 Ibid at p 154. Van der Walt states that there is a difference between the SCA holding that the lack of provision 
of adequate housing made the execution unenforceable and thus causing a deprivation of land, as opposed to 
the lack of provision of adequate housing cause the unlawful occupation in the first place. He emphasizes this 
difference because he believed that the SCA went with the former option because the second could have been 
easily countered by the lack of causal link. There would have probably not been any evidence to the effect that 
the State’s failure to provide access to housing directly caused the respondents to unlawfully occupy 
Modderklip’s land. 
186 Ibid. 








In this matter, three different applicants approached the Western Cape High Court and their 
applications were consolidated.188 The applications have different factual backgrounds, which 
Fortuin J covered extensively in a 116-page judgment handed down in August 2017. The three 
applicants were Mrs Fischer (first respondent in Fischer), Mr Stock (first respondent in Stock) 
and Copper Moon Trading 203 (PTY) Ltd (first respondent in Coppermoon). The first and 
second respondents for the three applications were the same, ‘The persons listed on annexure 
X to the notice of motion and those persons whose identity are unknown to the applicant and 
who are unlawfully occupying or attempting to occupy ERF150 (remaining extent) Phillipi, 
Cape Division, Province of the Western Cape’ and the City of Cape Town. The occupied land 
was known as ‘Marikana’. 
 
What makes this case noteworthy were the size of the occupation, which consisted of 60 000 
unlawful occupiers, and the subsequent remedies sought by the landowners. The latter sought 
an order from the Court requiring the municipality to purchase or in the alternative, expropriate 
the occupied land. It was obvious from the sheer magnitude of the unlawful occupation that 
the municipality would not have the requisite resources to provide alternative housing within 
a reasonable amount of time. In fact, this much was conceded by the municipality.189 While 
section 9(3)(a) of the Housing Act allows for a municipality to expropriate land under certain 
circumstances,190 and in addition to that, the City of Cape Town might have had the available 
resources to purchase or expropriate the property, it did not do so.191 This left the question open 






188 Supra note 9 para 6. 
189 Ibid paras 75 and 103. 
190 Housing Act 107 of 1997; Section 9(3)(a) says the following: 
“(3) (a) A municipality may by notice in the Provincial Gazette expropriate any land required by it for 
the purposes of housing development in terms of any national housing programme, if- 
(i) it is unable to purchase the land on reasonable terms through negotiation with the owner thereof; 
(ii) it has obtained the permission of the MEC to expropriate such land before the notice of 
expropriation is published in the Provincial Gazette; and 
(iii) such notice of expropriation is published within six months of the date on which the permission of 
the MEC was granted.” 
191 Supra note 9 para 169. 
46 
 
in the negative, stating the following, ‘As the Act assigned to the City the power to expropriate 
when necessary it would be inappropriate for the [C]ourt to usurp that power.’192 
 
Instead, the Court ordered the municipality to enter into negotiations for purchase of the 
occupied land under section 9(3)(a)(i) of the Housing Act and, if those negotiations were to 
fail, that the State ought to report to court on why it decided not to expropriate. Hence, instead 
of ordering the State to expropriate the land, the Court asked for a report on the potential failure 
to expropriate as it would allow the court to review the decision and this would not technically 
be a breach of the principle of separation of powers.193 In the first instance, if the parties entered 
into negotiations for purchase and reached an agreement, this would constitute a contract of 
sale of the occupied land. The existence of a contract presupposes the notion that the parties 
entered into it freely. In practice, the amount of money the landowners would receive would 
be one agreed upon. 
 
Should the negotiations fail, the municipality was still entitled to expropriate the land under 
section 9(3)(a) of the Housing Act. In this case, the financial compensation awarded to the 
landowners would be determined under the Expropriation Act and would not technically be an 
agreement. If the municipality refused to expropriate the land, the High Court was empowered 
to review this decision under administrative law and set it aside. This approach, in practice, 
would achieve the same results as an expropriation order due to the fact that the Court would 
have had to assess why the municipality refused to expropriate the land, and the compensation 
would still be calculated under the Expropriation Act. Despite leading to the same results as a 
court ordering the State to expropriate, this approach does not answer the question as to whether 
courts are empowered to order the State to expropriate land for housing. This is because the 
court’s power to engage in judicial review of an expropriation order does not engage issues of 
separation of powers and is significantly different from ordering the executive to rise to its 
duties through a specific method. The differences will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
 
This decision was appealed to the SCA in 2019, by the Socio-Economic Rights Institute on 
behalf of the occupiers. However, around a year later, in March 2020, the parties reached an 
 
 
192 Ibid para 121. 
193 L Draga and S Fick ‘Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers: could the court have interpreted the ‘may’ in section 9(3)(a) 
of the Housing Act as a ‘must’ under the circumstances of the case?’ (2019) South African Journal on Human 
Rights 35:4 406. 
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agreement, which was made an order of the SCA. The City of Cape Town is required by the 
order to ‘purchase the properties that are the subject of the High Court’s order at a price to be 
determined in an arbitration between the City of Cape Town and the property owners.’194 The 
order also establishes that the decision of the arbitrators may not be appealed. While this 
decision has been welcomed by the occupiers and is definitely a decisive and welcomed step 
away from expensive litigation, legal certainty would have benefitted from a judgment from 
the SCA as well as, potentially, the Constitutional Court on appeal. 
 
(d) Conclusion 
In Chapter II, this dissertation considered sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution and their 
interpretation. It established that their constant interaction with each other gives rise to a 
relationship between the two sections. This Chapter confirms the existence of such a 
relationship through jurisprudence of different South African courts. However, this Chapter 
also uncovers the flagrant apprehension of South African courts with respect to ordering the 
State to expropriate land even where it could potentially be the most blatant remedy. There is 
a general angst from the judiciary that courts would be encroaching on the territory of the 
executive, thereby breaching the principle of separation of powers, if they were to order the 
State to expropriate land. This patent hesitation has caused many scholars to believe that courts 
may simply not issue such an order. Even the scholars who venture to answer in the affirmative, 
do so with a faltering voice. The next chapter will thus steadfastly pursue the claim that South 





















194 SCA order for Fischer supra note 7 available at https://www.seri-sa.org/images/SCA_Fisher_Order- 
4March2020.pdf, accessed on 18 November 2020. 
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IV. CAN COURTS ORDER EXPROPRIATION? 
 
‘To be of the law, as opposed to philosophy and economic theory … one must take reality as 
the primary realm of activity. Law moves beyond articulation to implementation, and legal 
scholarship therefore must address the complexities of acting within an imperfect, resisting, 
often vulgar real world. In law, reality is not a footnote to theory or an appendix to the ideal.  
The claims of reality are a central intellectual imperative as much as a practical one.’195 
 
One may talk endlessly about what would happen in a social utopia; there would be no housing 
crisis and no need for ‘land grabs’ as there would be no homelessness. However, as this quote 
perfectly illustrates, the law would be of no use if it did not consider the harsh reality in which 
it has to apply and regulate social behaviour. In this way, one simply cannot solely accept that 
expropriation would be the perfect remedy, and thus, the crux of this dissertation is whether it 
is a feasible remedy. Through the consideration of existing case law, it has become clear that 
South African courts have been hesitant to debate the issue of judicial expropriation of land 
when it comes to the provision of housing. Yet, with increasing numbers of unlawful land 
occupations and the continued failure of the State to cater for the housing needs of the South 
African population, unjust and inequitable evictions will become a common feature faced by 
our courts. Faced with another matter like Fischer, could a court order the State to expropriate 
land to house the unlawful occupiers? This Chapter will answer this question by looking at 
expropriation under section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution while addressing the concerns raised 
by numerous scholars and courts vis-à-vis why a court should steer clear of judicial 
expropriation. 
 
(a) Alternative Means to Order the State to Expropriate Occupied Land for Housing 
 
 
While the SCA ‘tantalizingly’ remarked in Modderklip that ‘it is questionable whether a court 
may order an organ of State to expropriate property’, it also became evident from then that  
separation of powers concerns reign supreme when it comes to this debate. The Constitutional 
Court, opting to remain quiet on the issue in Modderklip,196 has since then not had the 
opportunity to decide the matter. Lower courts and scholars have found other ways in which to 
get the State to expropriate land for housing; Fischer being a case in point. There, the High 
 
 
195 P Gerwitz ‘Remedies and Resistance’ (1992) Yale LJ 680. 
196 Modderklip CC supra note 5 paras 61-64. 
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Court ordered the City of Cape Town to ‘enter into good faith negotiations’ with the owners of 
the properties ‘in order to purchase their properties within two months of this order’.197 In the 
event that these negotiations fail, the High Court ordered the City of Cape Town ‘to report to 
this court within two months of this order whether expropriation of the properties in terms of 
section 9(3) of the Housing Act was considered, and if not, why not.’198 Through the second, 
alternative leg of this order, Fortuin J. in effect required the City of Cape Town to exercise its 
power under section 9(3)(a) of the Housing Act and would review its decision not to exercise 
this power. In this way, the High Court avoided the much-debated issue of separation of 
powers,199 as it did not directly order the municipality to expropriate land and instead would 
review this decision under administrative law. 
 
However, it is clear that while this method allows the court not to breach the separation of 
powers principle, it is not an answer as to whether a court can order the State to expropriate 
land for the purposes at hand. Rather, it is an indirect way for the court to still somehow review 
the decision of the State to not expropriate the land as opposed to a direct order for the State to 
do so. Thus, it is not considered to be an alternative in this dissertation. 
 
An additional means suggested, based on the same facts as the Fischer case, would be to read 
the ‘may’ in section 9(3)(a) of the Housing Act as a ‘must’. This was argued by the occupiers 
in the case and further discussed by Fick and Draga.200 The occupiers relied on Levy v Levy, 
where the SCA held that, 
 
‘a statutory enactment conferring a power in permissive language may nevertheless have to be 
construed as making it the duty of the person or authority in whom the power is reposed to 








197 Fischer supra note 9 para 213. 
198 Ibid para 214. 
199 This will be discussed towards the end of this chapter. 
200 Supra note 193. 
201 Levy v Levy [1991] 2 All SA 407 (A) at para 32 and First Respondents’ Heads of Argument (17 August 2016) at 




This is an interesting approach which, although novel and fascinating, has constraints 
acknowledged within the article itself.202 Section 9(3)(a)(ii) still requires the municipality to 
obtain the permission of the Member of the Executive Council (MEC). Thus, reading the ‘may’ 
in section 9(3)(a) of the Housing Act as a ‘must’ does not guarantee expropriation. 
Additionally, an argument could be made that the words ‘any land required by [the 
municipality] for the purposes of housing development in terms of any national housing 
programme’ (emphasis added) imply two things; that the land at stake already has to be within 
an existing programme, and that it ought to be ‘required’. Fick and Draga get past these two 
implications swiftly, by suggesting that the national housing programme would be the State’s 
Emergency Housing Programme (EHP),203 which in its nature needs to be rapidly evolving and 
malleable for the needs of people who require housing, and that the land would be required for 
said programme because ‘[T]he municipality is required to house the occupiers, within its 
available resources, so as to avoid their homelessness and vindicate the landowner’s rights.’204 
 
While these are apt suggestions, they might not necessarily be applicable in this dissertation. 
As will be seen in the later discussion of the Modderklip land, now called ‘Gabon’, land 
occupations on a grand scale tend to develop into long-lasting – if not permanent – informal 
settlements. Thus, this dissertation does not pretend to claim that the housing provided on the 
expropriated land would be for temporary purposes. Instead, it acknowledges the need for 
security of tenure of the unlawful occupiers and consequently, that the housing ought probably 
not to be categorized under the State’s EHP. Should the land then fall under a different national 
housing programme, the considerations under whether it is ‘required for the purposes of 
housing development’ under said program would be altered. These are considerations which 
would need to be kept in mind under this approach. Thus, all things being equal, this 
dissertation proposes an alternative empowering provision which would allow the court to 
expropriate land: section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
 
(b) Is expropriation a ‘Just and Equitable order’? 
 
 
Section 172(1)(b) reads as follows, ‘When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a 
court may make any order that is just and equitable.’ 
 
202 Supra note 193 at 407. 






At first glance, this provision gives the court expansive discretion to craft any remedy which it 
might deem suitable. From an analysis of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of this 
section, it can be seen that the Court was careful not to constrict this discretion through a strict 
definition.205 The Court instead opted to identify factors which ought to be borne in mind when 
crafting an order under the section. However, the Court still made a conscious decision to 
always remind parties that ‘wide though this jurisdiction may be, it is not unbridled’.206 In fact, 
in Mhlope, Chief Justice Mogoeng strictly emphasized the circumstances under which this 
power may be used by the Court: 
 
‘It bears emphasis that this is an exceptional case that cries out for an exceptional solution or 
remedy to avoid a constitutional crisis which could have grave consequences. It is about the 
upper guardian of our Constitution responding to its core mandate by preserving the integrity 
of our constitutional democracy. And that explains the unique or extraordinary remedy we 
have crafted….’207 
 
This was again highlighted by the Court in Black Sash I. 208 In addition to this, the 
Constitutional Court has indicated that the powers of the Court under section 172(1)(b) turns 
around the operational words ‘just and equitable’ and what constitutes justice and equity.209 
The majority in Electoral Commission v Mhlope held that the words “just and equitable” in 
section 172(1)(b) required that considerations of how equity will best be advanced needed to 
 
 
205 This observation comes from a close reading of Corruption Watch NPC and Others v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others; Nxasana v Corruption Watch NPC and Others 2018 (2) SACR 442 (CC) (Corruption 
Watch); Electoral Commission v Mhlope and Others 2016 (5) SA 1 (CC) (Mhlope); Black Sash Trust v Minister of 
Social Development and Others (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 (3) SA 335 (CC) (Black Sash I); and 
Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1. 
206 Corruption Watch ibid para 68. 
207 Mhlope supra note 205 para 137. 
208 Black Sash I supra note 205 para 51. 
209 Surprisingly, not much has been written on section 172(1)(b) in this context and what renders an order just 
and equitable. The discussion around section 172(1)(b) has revolved around orders around declarations of 
invalidity and their extension. The focus of academics has instead been on what constitutes “appropriate relief” 
under section 38 of the Constitution. Section 38 “Enforcement of Rights” states the following: 
“Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the 
Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a 
declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are - 
a. anyone acting in their own interest; 
b. anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
c. anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
d. anyone acting in the public interest; and 
an association acting in the interest of its members.” 
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be taken into account when choosing a remedy.210 However, the Court did not define what 
justice and equity entails; and from a reading of the different cases which deal with section 
172(1)(b), it would seem that the terms would consist of an intuitive understanding of these 
factors on a case-by-case basis. The issue of ‘appropriate relief’ in the form of a ‘just and 
equitable’ order was also discussed by the Constitutional Court in Hoffman.211 There, the Court 
held that elements of justice and fairness were important when considering the appropriateness 
of a remedy.212 According to the Court, ‘fairness requires a consideration of the interests of all 
those who might be affected by the order’.213 
 
It seems uncontroversial that an order which would be just and equitable would vindicate all 
the constitutional rights which have been infringed. In cases such as Modderklip or Fischer,214 
it can be seen from different courts’ approaches that only two possible remedies were identified 
as being able to protect both the land owner’s and land occupiers’ rights; either allowing 
occupiers to stay on the property until alternative accommodation was provided and secured 
by the State, or awarding constitutional damages.215 In Modderklip, these remedies were 
coupled. However, if one were to go to Gabon (the settlement which developed from the 
farmland occupied in Modderklip) in the year 2020, one would see that the occupation grew in 
size exponentially despite the State being under the duty to incrementally relocate occupiers to 
temporary housing so that the owner could regain full possession of their land. It has become 
evident that 17 years later, not only has no relocation been carried out but a seemingly 
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Figure 1: A young child going to one of the water tanks in Gabon, Daveyton, to get the daily supply of water for 





Figure 2: The site of the Daveyton Empilweni HIV & Aids Projects in Gabon, next to a creche (Tanveer Rashid 
Jeewa, 12 August 2020). 
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Figure 3: One of the streets in Gabon, Daveyton – with electricity supplied to numerous dwellings and movable 
toilets provided by the State (Tanveer Rashid Jeewa, 12 August 2020). 
 
From mere observation, one could conclude that there is a degree of permanence in the 
occupation of Gabon. It would be almost practically impossible to relocate all the residents; 
and the longer the State takes to relocate the occupiers, the more the settlement will grow. 
Thus, over this time, the occupiers’ rights to housing were only respected to the extent that they 
have been housed until they are relocated. They did not enjoy security of tenure as they lived 
in the belief, based on the Court order, that there would be impending relocation. Likewise, the 
land owner was never able to fully enjoy the benefits that come with ownership of the plot of 
land. According to the common law understanding of ownership, the owner has certain 
entitlements to the land, which include but is not limited to, “the entitlement to use the property 
(ius utendi); the entitlement to physically control the property (ius possidendi); the entitlement 
to alienate or encumber the property (ius disponendi); and the entitlement to vindicate the 
property (ius vindicandi)”.216 As illustrated before, the constitutional dispensation has now 
enabled limitations on the common law concept of ownership but these entitlements remain 
existent. The entitlement most prominently associated with ownership is the right to possess 
and physically control the property. While the landowner in Modderklip still possesses this 
right, in practice it is almost unenforceable due to the presence of the unlawful occupiers. 
 
The land owner only has a title deed to prove ownership of the property but cannot occupy it 
or have possession because there are already occupiers on the land. He may in theory sell the 
land but in practice, the land’s value depreciates from the moment the land is occupied. The 
more permanent this occupation becomes, the more the land’s value depreciates. This is 
logically based on the fact that no sensible farmer would want to buy Modderklip’s land if it is 
occupied by more than 40 000 people whose evictions would be practically impossible. 
Additionally, as Modderklip had claimed when he first approached the Pretoria division of the 
High Court, land which has been used for informal settlements is often riddled with health 
hazards. Modderklip can then only dispose of the land, as it is the only other ownership benefit 
that he still enjoys. Although the owner received constitutional damages, this was meant to be 









Hence, despite the Constitutional Court’s order in Modderklip CC being a combination of the 
only remedies which can protect both the land occupiers’ and owners’ rights, their rights were 
still being limited. As of 2020, the limitation has been ongoing for 17 years. In light of this, it 
is argued that an order from the Constitutional Court amounting to judicial expropriation would 
be just and equitable in those circumstances. The land owner would have been compensated 
for the value of the land, and not being burdened with an uncertain future of owning land which 
might be good for nothing save for being disposed of. As for the occupiers, there would be no 
urgency to have them relocated as the land would now be State’s land. Thus, they would have 
shelter, have more security of tenure and not have to face the possibilities of being relocated to 
an area far from their place of work, or children’s schools. Understandably, this proposed court 
order is not as straightforward, and this dissertation will explore the obstacles later. 
 
In Mhlope and Corruption Watch, the Court emphasized that ‘paramount in the relief [under a 
just and equitable order] is the vindication of the rule of law’.217 While factors such as fairness, 
justice and equity are those which more often than not lie within the discretion of the Court, 
the rule of law does not. Out of all the factors mentioned by the court which are relevant to the 
dispensation of a just and equitable order, it is the only one with a definition and a constant 
application in the Court. The rule of law is a founding value of the Constitution,218 and is best 
articulated in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case where the Constitutional Court said, 
‘There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, 
and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject 
to constitutional control.’219 
 
To put it simply, the rule of law is the notion that laws, as they stand, apply to each individual 
by virtue of the fact that they are public knowledge and clear in meaning.220 The national 
legislature is admittedly best placed to generalize and create laws as they have been 
democratically put into this role by the people and are seen to be ‘the most responsive to the 
 
 
217 Supra note 48 at para 130 and Corruption Watch supra note 205 para 69. 
218 Section 1(c) of the Constitution states the following: 
“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values… 
supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.” 
219 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
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people’.221 As the late Antonin Scalia has written, ‘Executives and judges handle individual 
cases; the legislature generalizes.’222 The rule of law demands many things of the Court, but 
mostly that the law is applied to everyone alike, and that it is respected. Thus, a society where 
the State does not comply with an order of the Court, as is clearly the case from what can be 
seen of the lack of relocation from Gabon, the rule of law would be undermined. The State had 
a duty, arising from the Constitutional Court’s order in Modderklip CC to slowly relocate the 
occupiers so that Modderklip would eventually get their land back, and it has clearly not 
complied with this order. However, the author is conscious that relocation is no easy feat, 
especially for such a high number of occupiers. In fact, it could occur in such a small number 
that it would seem inconsequential compared to the number of new occupiers on the land. Yet, 
conceding on this point only further reinforces the proposed argument. The sheer magnitude 
of this relocation makes the order practically impossible to be complied with, which further 
undermines the rule of law. 
 
As opposed to the existing Modderklip CC order, unless budget restraints prevent 
expropriation, an order for the State to expropriate the land would be possible to comply with. 
Should the State fail to comply with this order, they could be held in contempt of court, save if 
there are intervening impossibilities. Consequently, an order amounting to judicial 
expropriation would be in line with the rule of law. Given the fact that this Court order 
promotes the rule of law, and as elaborated on before, is just and equitable given the 
circumstances, section 172(1)(b) allows for judicial expropriation in exceptional 
circumstances. Yet, if that is the case, then why has the Court never ordered the State to 
expropriate land for housing, despite having had the opportunity to do so? 
 
(c) Arguments against Judicial Expropriation 
 
 
Numerous scholars believe that the Court is not empowered to order the State to expropriate 
land. Property law luminary van der Walt believed that ‘the power of expropriation is based on 
statute and granted to specific administrators, who must exercise their statutory discretion when 
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‘courts cannot usurp this discretion or direct the expropriator in its exercise of the discretion.’224 
However, van der Walt also acknowledged that there was the potential for judicial 
expropriation where ‘uncommonly … legislation can authorize a court to bring about judicial 
expropriation by making an appropriate order in terms of the statute.’225 It is evident from the 
Housing Act and the Expropriation Act226 that these pieces of legislation do not empower the 
Court to expropriate land. 
 
This reluctance by scholars and courts to suggest that judicial expropriation is possible in South 
Africa goes back to the principle of separation of powers. Separation of powers was one of the 
constitutional principles against which the Constitutional Court had to consider whether the 
1996 Constitution complied. Constitutional Principle IV, namely, specified that ‘There shall 
be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate 
checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.’227 The aim of this 
principle is to ensure that no branch of government steps in the shoes of the other so as to allow 
a certain level of independence which facilitates ‘appropriate checks and balances’ between 
the three branches of government. 
 
Yet, although somewhat defined, separation of powers is flexible as ‘the [branches] are partly 
interacting, not wholly disjointed’.228 Due to the absence of a universal model of separation of 
powers, South African courts have over time developed its characteristically South African 
model which the Constitutional Court had, in 1998, hoped would be ‘one that fits the particular 
system of government provided for in the Constitution and that reflects a delicate balancing, 
informed both by South Africa’s history and its new dispensation, between the need, on the 
one hand, to control government by separating powers and enforcing checks and balances, and, 
on the other, to avoid diffusing power so completely that the government is unable to take 
timely measures in the public interest.’229 
 
In this case, since the form of expropriation most commonly known is administrative 
expropriation and in the absence of a legislative sourcing power for judicial expropriation, the 
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principle of separation of powers has been the biggest concern of scholars and judges alike. If 
expropriation lies exclusively in the realm of the executive’s powers, judicial expropriation 
would be a blatant breach of separation of powers. However, the matter becomes more 
complicated when the Court is encountered by factual scenarios where, as discussed before, 
judicial expropriation seems to be a justified remedy which is just and equitable and would be 
the only remedy to vindicate the constitutional rights of all those concerned. This much was 
made clear by the Constitutional Court in Mwelase: 
 
‘The courts and government are not at odds about fulfilling the aspirations of the Constitution. 
Nor does the separation of powers imply a rigid or static conception of strictly demarcated 
functional roles. The different branches of constitutional power share a commitment to the 
Constitution’s vision of justice, dignity and equality. That is our common goal. The three 
branches of government are engaged in a shared enterprise of fulfilling practical constitutional 
promises to the country’s most vulnerable.’230 
 
More relevant to the factual scenarios discussed in this dissertation, the Court in Mwelase 
added: 
 
‘In cases that cry out for effective relief, tagging a function as administrative or executive, in 
contradistinction to judicial, though always important, need not always be decisive. For it is 
crises in governmental delivery, and not any judicial wish to exercise power, that has required 
the courts to explore the limits of separation of powers jurisprudence. When egregious 
infringements have occurred, the courts have had little choice in their duty to provide effective 
relief. That was so in Black Sash I, and it is the case here. In both, the most vulnerable and 
most marginalised have suffered from the insufficiency of governmental delivery.’231 
 
When it comes to an ongoing housing crisis where more than 40 000 people are so desperate 
for housing that they occupy land and build shacks in order not to be homeless, there is little 
space to doubt that the occupiers fall under the category of ‘the most vulnerable and most 
marginalized’ who ‘suffered from the insufficiency of government delivery’. Cases like 
Modderklip and Fischer are those which ‘cry out for effective relief’ and justify the flexibility 
of the principle of separation of powers. This is even more so because the Constitutional Court 
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in Doctors for Life guarded the Court against ‘the bogeyman of separation of powers 
concerns’232 causing the Court from evading its duties: 
 
‘[W]hile the doctrine of separation of power is an important one in our constitutional 
democracy, it cannot be used to avoid the obligation of a court to prevent the violation of the 
Constitution. The right and the duty of this Court to protect the Constitution are derived from 
the Constitution, and this Court cannot shirk from that duty.’233 
 
It is clear that in such cases where the State has failed to fulfil its duties, in this case the 
occupiers’ rights to housing which thereafter caused an infringement of the land owner’s right 
to property, the Court should not shun its duty by not ordering the State to fulfill theirs. Other 
less substantive arguments against expropriation of land to provide for the housing of occupiers 
are that the remedy would encourage ‘shack-farming’ or would be rewarding ‘queue jumping’. 
In Modderklip, the land owner was accused of shack farming which entails providing land for 
the building of shacks for the exchange of money. The Court dismissed this allegation as there 
was no evidence to prove such. Even if the State could prove that shack-farming was 
encouraged by singular instances of judicial expropriation, the Court would need to engage in 
a balancing exercise to determine whether the need for prevention of shack-farming outweighs 
the rights of land occupiers and owner from being vindicated. Evidence would also need to be 
produced to prove that judicial expropriation would reward queue-jumping. This would be 
quite difficult as NGOs such as SERI have proved, time and time again, through vast research 
that a waiting list for housing does not exist and thus, it would be impossible to jump a non- 
existent queue.234 
 
As some of these factors would depend on a case-by-case basis, the only concrete objection to 
judicial expropriation in exceptional circumstances would be, the encroachment of the 
principle of separation of powers. Yet, it is clear from consistent jurisprudence of the 
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From this enquiry about the feasibility of an order for judicial expropriation, it is clear that 
many obstacles lie in the way of the courts. This paper does not aim to make light of a 
fundamental and necessary principle such as that of separation of powers. This mechanism to 
keep the branches of government accountable through checks and balances is a pillar of South 
African democracy. Yet, as was seen from the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, it is a 
flexible principle which ought to be adapted to meet society’s current needs. The solution is 
one of balance and balance is struck in this case by only using expropriation as a remedy in 
exceptional circumstances, to avoid the ongoing limitation of the rights of all parties involved. 
This ongoing limitation, if not put an end to despite a court order requiring it to be remedied, 
would lead to an unjustifiable limitation. In addition to this, if judicial expropriation is rejected 
as a remedy, any other remedy would result in unenforceable eviction orders which would 
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‘We have no reason to celebrate this so-called ‘freedom’ while we live in indignity. We have 
no reason to celebrate ‘freedom’ while we have no land. … We have no reason to celebrate 
‘freedom’ when many of us remain without safe and dignified homes, and continually at the 
mercy of evictions, fires and floods in our shacks.’236 
 
This quote from S’bu Zikode, the President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (Shack Dwellers), on 
Freedom Day 2019 puts the hopes and aspirations of the Constitution in perspective. As 
illustrated in the previous chapter, ‘law without remedies is like a broken pencil. Pointless.’237 
Likewise, no matter how transformative the Constitution purports to be, if it does not change 
the living circumstances of its constituents, it will sooner or later lose its credibility to said 
constituencies. With respect to the right to access to adequate housing, the State has done a 
meager job at providing housing to the South African population. 
 
Consequently, this leads the reader to a pattern that this dissertation aims to have exposed by 
now. The pitiful attempt and dismal failure of the State to provide housing has led to people 
taking matters in their own hands. The increasing numbers of land occupations occur as a direct 
result of people failing to have their housing needs met. As homeless people occupy land and 
get evicted, the vicious cycle of insecure tenure repeats itself. Similar to what happened in the 
cases of PE Municipality238 and Modderklip,239 the occupiers simply move to another plot of 
land and resume occupation. Thus, as the Supreme Court of Appeal found in Modderklip SCA, 
the State is indirectly responsible for the occupation of private land in cases where people were 
driven to occupy this land out of homelessness.240 This, in turn, results in a deprivation of land 
of the land owner which is not under a law of general application, thereby infringing on their 
right under section 25(1). This clearly demonstrates the interplay of sections 25 and 26 of the 
Constitution. The State can be, and has been, held responsible for failing to give effect to the 
right to access to adequate housing of the land occupiers, as well as causing the deprivation of 
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This limitation can be temporary, depending on whether an eviction is just, equitable, and 
enforceable. However, in cases such as Modderklip241 and Fischer,242 where ordering an 
eviction order would not have been just and equitable or enforceable, the occupation tends to 
be ongoing. This is because it would be impossible to relocate such a large number of occupiers 
without causing mayhem in society and causing further occupation. As established in previous 
chapters, ongoing limitations of rights are potentially unjustifiable if a remedy is available. The 
only remedy which will give effect to both the land owner’s right to not be deprived of property, 
as well as the occupiers’ right to not be arbitrarily evicted from their home without an order of 
court (which ought to be PIE compliant), is for the State to expropriate the land. Thus, the 
owner would be compensated as per the Expropriation Act,243 and the occupiers would not be 
evicted arbitrarily from their homes. 
 
At the outset, this dissertation was authentic in conceding to the harshness of expropriation as 
a remedy. In light of how drastic this remedy is, it was not argued that expropriation was a 
preferred remedy. Instead, the focus of the research question was whether the courts can order 
the State to expropriate the occupied land if an eviction order would be unjust and inequitable 
or unenforceable. When making such an order, the Court will have to consider several factors, 
such as the data available regarding the land and its sustainability as temporary or permanent 
housing location. However, due to the limitations of this dissertation, it was impossible to also 
devote time and effort to this separate question. In any event, the factors which the Court ought 
to consider when making this order does not affect whether the Court has the power to make 
such an order in the first place. 
 
To answer this question, this dissertation has looked into the ways in which the Constitution 
revolutionized the lens through which the courts ought to look at eviction cases. Rather than 
prioritizing the owner’s right to their land and automatically evicting the occupiers, the 
adjudicating body ought to engage in a balancing exercise. Having been stripped of its 
sacrosanct status, ownership no longer automatically trumps unlawful land occupation. 
Consequently, although in many cases sections 25 and 26 operate at odds with each other, the 
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turning to the draconian approach to occupation which apartheid had imposed in the pre- 
constitutional era. 
 
This was further confirmed in the Constitutional Court’s judgment in PE Municipality.244 The 
unanimous judgment in this case discussed how this new approach was cemented by the 
promulgation of PIE which aimed at infusing grace in the process of this balancing exercise.  
Far from trying to change the nature of the occupiers’ non-right on the land, PIE aimed at 
putting in place safeguards which would guard against homelessness and further entrenching 
racial policies that had been put into place and anchored during apartheid. However, when the 
Constitutional Court had another chance to discuss this interplay between sections 25 and 26, 
it wisely opted not to broach the subject of judicial expropriation, opting instead to order the 
State to pay constitutional damages in Modderklip CC.245 
 
This evident avoidance of the matter of judicial expropriation by the Constitutional Court led 
scholars and other courts to believe that it was strictly off the table. In fact, as mentioned, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal explicitly said that this would a breach of the principle of separation 
of powers.246 This is manifestly because no legislation allows for the courts to order 
expropriation and it would seem that this would be strictly reserved to the executive. 
 
Yet, this dissertation argues that under section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, courts are 
empowered to order judicial expropriation if it qualifies as a “just and equitable” order. 
Whether an order would fall under this category would depend on different factors and has to 
be judged on a case-by-case basis. This extraordinary remedy is to be rarely resorted to, but it 
is contended that the occupation of privately-owned land by a number of occupiers which 
would be impossible to relocate, resulting in an unenforceable eviction order and ongoing 
limitation of rights, is an extraordinary case. Under these circumstances, it is argued that the 
court would be empowered under section 172(1)(b) to order judicial expropriation. 
 
The main obstacle which would still need to be overcome would be whether courts would be 
breaching the principle of separation of powers. It is unfortunate that the judiciary and civil 
society has had to flex their saviour muscle in light of the repetitive failures of the State to 
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provide for its citizens. However, much like the Constitution is a living document, so should 
the courts be adaptable to the times as well as the needs of society. The separation of powers 
principle should never be used as a bar to prevent the courts from also performing their duties. 
While the court should not place itself in the shoes of the executive or legislature, it also has 
its own duties to abide to, and in many circumstances, it unfortunately has to be creative in 
crafting novel remedies which can give effect to the rights of all parties and remedy all 
constitutional violations which have occurred. This was seen in Mwelase,247 Black Sash I,248 
Corruption Watch249 and many other cases where the Constitutional Court had to be more 
innovative to play its role as guardian of the Constitution. The principle of separation of powers 
is after all elusive and flexible. It is this flexibility that allows for checks and balances. 
 
With the gift of hindsight, having now seen Modderklip’s land, one can attest to the fact that, 
at most, very evictions were carried out. This means that the limitations of both the rights of 
the land owners and the occupiers have been ongoing for 19 years. If one were to consider this 
with the backdrop that the owner wanted to sell the land to the State, one would have to agree 
with the SCA; in an ideal world the State would have expropriated the land.250 Unfortunately, 
this is not an ideal world. In fact, South Africa is the furthest from being an ideal society.  
Inequality is rampant and pungent in this country and the unfaltering branch of the government 
has been the judiciary. This, of course, does not mean that the judiciary should remain 
unchecked, but it also should not be deterred from fulfilling its role. This task should be carried 
out by the Court whether the State is failing tremendously or not. Unfortunately, when the 
violations of rights are so gross and blatant as is the case in these types of unlawful land 
occupations, the Court might have to intervene by crafting novel remedies. And should it have 
to do so, it is empowered to order judicial expropriation under section 172(1)(b) of the 
Constitution. 
 
From myths about shack-farming to valid concerns about breaching the separation of powers, 
the important notion which one ought to keep in mind is that such an order would only be 
applicable in exceptional circumstances. The branches of the government are like those of a 
tree; under inexplicably strong gusts of wind, they will bend and touch each other. However, 
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it is the very flexibility of these branches that allows the tree not to snap under the strength of 
the wind. Thus, while the principle of separation of powers is a safeguard against abuses, it 
should also not be a determinative stumbling block. It should require the courts to only consider 
an order for judicial expropriation under narrow circumstances, but not bar the order from 
being made. It is consequently clear that judicial expropriation would fall squarely under 
section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. This is because, under the extraordinary circumstances 
which would lead to an unenforceable eviction order, judicial expropriation would amount to 
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